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The Territorial Governor as Ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs and the 
Decline of American-Indian Relationships (135 pp.) 
Director: Michael S. Mayer 
This thesis examines the role of territorial governors as 
ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs and the 
negative consequences combining the two offices had on 
Indians, particularly in Montana Territory from 1864-1873. 
The federal government combined the two territorial 
offices because it saved the United States Government money, 
but this created a conflict of interest. Effective 
territorial governors promoted their territories to 
encourage settlement, development, and, ultimately, 
statehood. However, development led to white encroachment 
on Indian lands and rights. Thus, the tasks of 
administrating white men's affairs while maintaining the 
rights of Indians often came into conflict. Self-interest 
dictated that the governor concentrate on his role as 
territorial governor, since the potential rewards for doing 
so, such as a seat in the U.S. Senate, were both obvious and 
greater. The accomplishment of their objectives as 
governors worked to the detriment of their responsibilities 
as ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs. They 
therefore either neglected the latter office or used the 
position to achieve wealth (though stealing) or fame 
(through military action against their charges. 
The experience of Montana's territorial governors as ex-
of f icio superintendents of Indian affairs provides an 
insight into the problem of territorial governors serving as 
superintendents of Indian affairs. The contradiction in 
duties between the two offices made it virtually impossible 
adequately to fulfill the obligations Indian superintendent. 
This explains why even conscientious territorial governors 
failed in that regard. The problems, however, ran deeper 
than changes in administrative policy could ever solve. 
Even the attempted structural reforms in the office of 
superintendent of Indian affairs failed to address the basic 
problem. The tragedy of United States-Indian relations 
transcended any adjustment in administrative practice. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE TERRITORIAL GOVERNOR 
AS EX—OFFICIO SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 
AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN-INDIAN RELATIONS: 
MONTANA TERRITORY, 1864-1866 
Montana's first two Territorial Governors, Sidney 
Edgerton and Green Clay Smith, also served as the ex-officio 
Superintendents of Indian Affairs for the Montana 
Superintendency. It was not unusual to combine these two 
different offices into one position. Since the Republic's 
beginnings, the United States Congress, through law and 
practice, had combined these two different administrative 
positions, with conflicting interests, into one office with 
uneven results. In Montana Territory, however, the practice 
proved particularly disastrous to the preservation of 
peaceful tribal relations; local politics defeated common 
sense and duty. 
Thus, when Sidney Edgerton accepted the territorial 
governorship on June 22, 1864, he also assumed the position 
and duties associated with being ex-officio Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs for Montana Territory.1 Edgerton, and 
1The practice of designating whoever held the office of 
governor as superintendent of Indian affairs, or ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs, can be traced back to 
September 11, 1789, when Congress authorized the payment of 
$2,000 annual salary to the governor of the Northwest 
Territory in compensation for his duties rendered as Indian 
1 
2 
the other individuals who served simultaneously as 
territorial governors and ex-officio superintendents of 
Indian affairs, often found themselves unable to reconcile 
their contrary positions when they performed their 
"official" duties. The practice of employing one man to 
hold the offices of territorial governor and Indian 
superintendent represented a conflict of interests which 
Congress overlooked. When a member of a federal Indian 
treaty commission, a successful territorial governor signed 
treaties that gained title to tribal lands. These lands 
could then be opened up to white settlement. A territorial 
governor measured his ultimate success when his territory 
achieved statehood, whereas an Indian superintendent 
measured his success when he insured the assimilation of 
native tribesmen into the dominant white society while 
preserving peace between the tribesmen and frontiersmen. 
Under this ideal scenario, these administrative objectives 
superintendent. See U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 
1776—March 2, 1799), "An Act for establishing the Salaries of 
the Executive Officers of the Government with their Assistants 
and Clerks," p. 68. This practice was continued through the 
time Montana Territory was created. Section 2 of the Montana 
Territory Enabling Act stated, "The Governor shall reside 
within said territory, and shall be commander-in-chief of the 
militia and superintendent of Indian affairs thereof." See 
Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative 
Years, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962) p. 
52, and U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 13, (December 1863 — 
December 18 65), "An Act to provide a temporary government for 
the Territory of Montana," 26 May 1864. 
3 
were not mutually exclusive. Both would be achieved when a 
territory became a state. By that time, the tribesmen were 
to have relinquished their hunter/gatherer or farmer/fisher 
lifestyles or been removed to another territory. In theory, 
once Indians had turned away from their hunter/gather 
lifestyle, they become assimilated and joined the local 
communities as citizens. With the assimilation of the 
tribesmen, the need for a superintendent of Indian Affairs 
would vanish. 
The federal government combined the two territorial 
offices because it saved the United States Government money. 
This short term thinking meant that one territorial 
official, had responsibility for two dichotomous frontier 
issues. The root of the conflict between the two offices 
lay in the conflict between whites and tribesmen over 
possession or use of land. Effective territorial governors 
promoted, or boosted, their territories to encourage 
settlement, development, and, ultimately, statehood. 
Boosterism, however, did not preserve peaceful relations 
with local tribal communities. Development eventually led 
to white encroachment on Indian lands and rights. Thus, the 
tasks of administrating white men's affairs while 
maintaining the rights of Indians often came into conflict. 
Self-interest dictated that the governor concentrate on his 
role as territorial governor, since the potential rewards 
4 
for doing so, such as a seat in the U.S. Senate, were both 
obvious and greater. The accomplishment of their objectives 
as governor worked to the detriment of their 
responsibilities as ex-officio superintendents of Indian 
affairs.2 They therefore either neglected the latter 
office or used the position to achieve wealth (though 
stealing) or fame (through military action against their 
charges.3 
The literature concerning the governance of Western 
Territories, and the Montana Territory in particular, has 
focused on particular politics and organization of 
territorial legislatures. It has paid little attention to 
the territorial governor's role as superintendent of Indian 
affairs. On the other hand, studies of Montana's 
reservation communities during the territorial period have 
concentrated on the agent/tribesmen relationship and either 
ignored, or deliberately failed to examine, the territorial 
2Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American 
West; 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1984) p. 41. 
3For a discussion of the conflicts between politics and 
Indian affairs see Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the 
United States: 1861-1890 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1947) and William M. Neil "The Territorial 
Governor as Indian Superintendent in the Trans-Mississippi 
West" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. 43, No. 2, 
(September 1956) 
5 
governor's role as head of Indian affairs.4 As a result, 
the literature has failed adequately to examine the role of 
Indian affairs in territorial politics. In a situation 
where the territory's leading politician also served as the 
official United States representative for Indian affairs, 
the two were inextricably interwoven. In addition, 
historians have failed to address the issue of the 
territorial boundaries also serving as an Indian 
superintendency and the territorial governor becoming an ex-
of f icio superintendent of Indian affairs by virtue of 
holding territorial gubernatorial office.5 
An unofficial criterion for a territory's transition to 
statehood required the establishment of a modicum of law, 
4Studies of agencies during the Montana Territorial 
period also fail to analyze the role of the Territorial 
Governor as a mid-level bureaucrat in the Indian service. For 
example, see John C. Ewers, The Blackfeet: Raiders on the 
Northwest Plains, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1976.) 
5Standard studies of Montana Territorial history simply 
do not provide an analysis of the governor as ex-of f icio 
superintendent of Indian affairs. The standard works 
consulted that follow this pattern of neglect include Clark C. 
Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 1864-
89 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), Michael P. 
Malone and Richard B. Roeder, Montana: A History of Two 
Centuries (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), K. 
Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1959, and James McClellan Hamilton, From 
Wilderness to Statehood: A History of Montana 1805-1900 
(Portland, OR: Binfords and Mont, 1957. One short article 
that does provide some insight is William M. Neil, "The 
Territorial Governor as Indian Superintendent." 
6 
order, and civilization within the territory's boundaries. 
The territorial governor, charged with grooming his 
territory for eventual statehood, discovered that one of the 
main obstacles he faced was the problem of imagined or real 
Indian depredations directed toward white settlers and the 
effects these had on territorial citizens. Indian activity 
threatened both statehood and the governor's career. The 
territorial governor became the sole official charged with 
bringing the territory into the Union as a state, protecting 
the interests of the Indian, and conducting United States 
Indian policy. These Herculean tasks could not be 
successfully accomplished until the Indians became 
"civilized," made acceptable to those white citizens within 
his superintendency, or subdued by the military. Thus, 
"civilizing" the Indians became a critical and important 
public and personal issue facing a territorial governor in 
his role as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs. 
Ironically, governor's neglected the position, much to the 
determent of Indian relations. 
Because much that transpired in the formation of Indian 
policy preceded the relatively late Montana Territory 
experience (1864-1869), this paper will trace the origins 
and implications of the United States Government's practice 
of combining the positions of territorial governor with that 
of the superintendent of Indian affairs. Additionally, 
7 
selected experiences of individual territorial governors are 
used to illustrate those means employed by them in the 
execution of their duties. 
CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORY OF COMBINING THE OFFICES OF TERRITORIAL 
GOVERNORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: 1789-1873 
The United States Congress had combined the 
responsibilities of the superintendent of Indian affairs 
with the territorial governor long before the creation of 
the Montana Territory and the Montana Superintendency of 
Indian Affairs. The practice of combining these two very 
diverse and often incompatible administrative posts began 
early in the history of the Republic with the passage of the 
Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787. This Act, which 
authorized the establishment of new states, also provided 
the nation with its earliest system of territorial 
government. The law defined the criteria for the 
establishment of a territorial government, and articulated 
the young nation's commitment to westward expansion. The 
Northwest Ordinance legislation created the framework by 
which a territory could become a state, with equal rights 
and responsibilities of the other states within the Union.6 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also mandated that the 
6See U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 1776 -March 
2, 1799) "An Act to provide for the Government of the 
Territory Northwest of the river Ohio," pp. 50-53, or Henry 
Steele Commanger, "The Northwest Ordinance", Documents of 
American History, seventh edition, (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1963) pp. 128-132. 
8 
9 
United States take those measures necessary to ensure the 
humane treatment of the Indian peoples who actually owned 
these western territories. Article III of the Northwest 
Ordinance provided that: 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed 
towards the Indians; their lands and property 
shall never be taken from them without their 
consent; and in their property rights and liberty, 
they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless 
in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; 
but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall 
from time to time by made for preventing wrongs 
being done to them, and for preserving peace and 
friendship with them.7 
The Northwest Ordinance created an irreconcilable 
dilemma when policy makers proclaimed that American westward 
expansion would be accomplished peacefully and assume that 
tribesmen would willingly accept western expansion. 
Congress further complicated peaceful expansion by charging 
the territorial governors not only with the duties of 
grooming each territory for eventual statehood, but also 
mandating that the territorial governors hold the office of 
ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs. On September 
11, 1789, Congress provided an annual salary of $2,000 to be 
paid to the Governor of the Northwest Territories as 
compensation for his duties "...and for discharging the 
7U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 1776 - March 2, 
1799) "An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory 
Northwest of the river Ohio, August 7, 1779. p. 52. 
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duties of superintendent of Indian affairs..."8 By 
enacting this legislation, Congress established the 
precedent of making territorial governors Indian officers, 
responsible for conducting United States policy and Indian 
affairs with the Indian tribes in their territory. 
The policy of making one man responsible for two 
different, potentially conflicting obligations (protecting 
Indian interests while encouraging territorial expansion) 
was doomed to failure. Why did Congress make this ill-
advised decision? James W. Nye, who served first as 
Nevada's territorial governor and ex-officio superintendent 
of Indian affairs from March 22, 1861 to July 18, 1865, and 
then as two-term senator from Nevada, explained the rational 
behind Congress' decision for combining the offices of 
territorial governor and ex-officio superintendent of Indian 
affairs. On the floor of the Senate he explained: 
The combination of duties is based upon the 
economy of the thing. The Governor can discharge 
the duties of superintendent, and thereby save 
money. A Governor in a new Territory can live 
just as cheap as a superintendent of Indian 
affairs, if he chooses; and to have two officers 
for this business makes too many heads.9 
8U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, June 1, 1789 - March 3, 
1799, "An Act for establishing the Salaries of the Executive 
Officers of Government, with their Assistants and Clerks," 
September 11, 1789. 
9The Congressional Globe, 4 0th Cong., 2d sess. No. 17 6. 
p. 2801. 
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In addition to cost effectiveness, Senator Nye believed that 
a territory would be in greater danger from Indian 
depredations if the office was split. He reasoned that 
there would be a delayed reaction in an Indian emergency as 
the territorial governor and superintendent of Indian 
affairs would have to confer as to the proper action to 
take. 
Senator Nye's attitude towards Indian affairs reflects 
the attitudes of those lawmakers who passed the legislation 
that created Montana Territory, and required the territorial 
governor to wear two hats. These men justified their 
improper actions "...as the cheapest way of handling Indian 
Affairs."10 The money saving practice of combining the 
posts of territorial governors and ex-officio 
Superintendents of Indian Affairs in the United States 
Territories led only to disaster in Montana as it had in 
other regions and times. Like Senator Nye, these lawmakers 
also perceived that position of superintendent of Indians 
affairs as one mainly concerned with punishing errant 
Indians, with little emphasis given to the protection of 
Indians' rights. 
From 1789 until 1824, the Secretary of War administered 
Indian affairs with the exception of the government owned 
10Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, p. 10. 
12 
and operated Indian trade factories. Congress created these 
factories under "An Act for establishing Trading Houses with 
the Indian Tribes" on April 18, 1796. This Act allowed 
President George Washington to 
...establish trading houses at such posts and 
places on the western frontiers, or in the Indian 
country, as he shall judge most convenient for the 
purpose of carrying on a liberal trade with the 
several Indian nations, within the limits of the 
United States.11 
From 1806 to 1822, a superintendent of Indian trade, 
directly responsible to the Secretary of War, administered 
these trade factories. These factories, designed to operate 
on a non-profit basis, allowed the Indians to secure trade 
goods, such as blankets, knives, and axes, at fair market 
value in exchange for their furs. Although popular with the 
Indians and those whites who believed that the government 
houses fostered better relations between the races, the 
factories came under increasing attack from traders and 
politicians who believed the government had overstepped its 
authority and embroiled itself in an area best left to free 
enterprise and "Yankee" ingenuity. 
Each Act authorizing the continuance of the factory 
system's existence usually remained in force for a period of 
three years before subsequent legislation of the same nature 
nU.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, July 4, 1776 - March 
2, 1799, "An Act for establishing Trading Houses with the 
Indian Tribes," April 18, 1796. 
13 
had again to be passed to continue its operation. The 
American Fur Company's owner, John Jacob Astor, and the St. 
Louis fur trading interests, whose positions were powerfully 
expressed on the Senate floor by their unofficial spokesman, 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, lobbied against the factories. 
Finally in May 1822, they convinced Congress to pass 
legislation that permanently disestablished the factories. 
Astor and Benton found their task simplified because 
Congress had never been fully comfortable engaged in the 
Indian trade.12 
As the government trading factories closed, the Office 
of Indian Trade evolved into the Office of Indian Affairs. 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, without authorization or 
orders from Congress, created the Office of Indian Affairs 
on March 11, 1824 .13 Calhoun appointed Thomas L. McKenney, 
the last Superintendent of Indian Trade, as first 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.14 The Office of Indian 
Affairs operated within the War Department from its founding 
until July 9, 1832, at which time Congress authorized the 
appointment of a Commissioner of Indian Affairs who was 
responsible for directing and managing Indian Affairs and 
12Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, 
p. 92. 
13Ibid., p.56. 
14Ibid., p. 57. 
14 
reported to the Secretary of War. 
In 1849, Congress detached the Office of Indian Affairs 
from the Department of War and assigned it to the newly 
created Department of the Interior.15 Although now under 
the control of civilians, the Government's Indian policy did 
not change appreciably. The military still provided defense 
on the frontier. Because the regular military was often the 
only law and policy enforcement agency on the frontier, the 
separation of the Office of Indian Affairs from the War 
Department resulted in conflicts over jurisdiction leading 
to an inevitable lack of cooperation between the Department 
of the Interior and the Department of War. However, the 
rift provided each Department with a convenient scapegoat to 
blame when failures occurred in the implementation of 
federal Indian policy. The halls of government resounded 
with the echoes of each department's champion lawmaker 
competing to be heard over others in support of his 
particular Department.16 
Throughout these administrative changes, 
superintendencies and agencies were mainstay offices and 
15Edward E. Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1880: 
Historical Sketches (New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 
Inc., 1974), p. 1 
16Alban W. Hoopes, Indian Affairs and Their Administration 
with Special Reference to the West, 1849-60, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932) pp. 16-17. 
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comprised the two field divisions within the Office of 
Indian Affairs. Positions in both the Indian Bureau's 
administrative branch, headed by the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs and a cadre of clerks in Washington D.C., and its 
field force of superintendents and agents, were filled by 
political appointees and a few detached soldiers. 
Oftentimes, the men in the field did not see a tribesmen 
until they reached the seat of their respective 
superintendency or agency. Most appointments were based on 
no better qualification than faithful party service. 
Inexperienced with their charges, a majority of these 
appointees were merely incompetent, while others, realizing 
their positions were tenuous — dependent solely on election 
outcomes — came to the office with deliberate intentions to 
misuse their positions for personal gain in wealth, politics 
or both.17 
Superintendencies held general responsibility for 
Indians in a large geographic area, an area which usually 
included or mirrored an entire political division, such as 
Montana Territory. The governor of a territory often served 
as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs. Congress 
appointed full time superintendents in unorganized areas or 
on those occasions when the duties of a superintendent were 
17Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West, p. 42. 
16 
either particularly burdensome or volatile.18 All Indian 
superintendents, whether their status was as ex-officio or 
full-time, were not only required to oversee the Indians 
under their jurisdiction, but also required to supervise and 
to regulate those traders who conducted business with the 
Indians. In addition, they acted as watchdogs over the 
agents assigned to the respective agencies within their 
superintendencies. 
Until the 1870's, Indian superintendents and agents 
often enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and personal 
discretion when performing their duties in remote, isolated 
jurisdictions because conditions often made communications 
difficult if not impossible with federal authorities in 
Washington D.C.. On many occasions, superintendents 
appointed agents and selected the sites for the agency's 
headquarters. As the double pressures of the government's 
reservation policy and increased white immigration into 
Indian territory gradually forced the tribesmen onto 
reservations, the agencies lost their peripatetic nature and 
Congress drafted legislation mandating that agency 
headquarters be established in one location. With this 
centralization of authority, communications between 
Washington D.C. and the agencies improved, and subsequently 
laHill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 2. 
17 
the superintendents and agents lost much of their 
autonomy.19 Centralization and improved communications 
also led to direct communication between the commissioner of 
Indian affairs and Indian agents. With official 
correspondence bypassing the superintendent of Indian 
affairs, the status and authority of the office was so 
weakened that the position, regardless of its status as ex-
of f icio or full time, became obsolete after the Civil War. 
Individual Indian agencies and agents came under the 
jurisdiction of its assigned superintendencies and 
superintendents. Until the 1870's, most Indian agents 
reported to their superintendent; however, a few reported 
directly to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 
Washington, D.C. Because many Indian agencies were isolated 
and far from communication centers, the Indian agent's 
position occasionally became crucial. They were often the 
only government representation residing with the Indians. 
The Indian agent, by virtue of his exclusivity, occasionally 
undertook the delicate tasks of diplomacy and negotiation to 
secure treaties with various tribes. The agent's 
responsibilities included the distribution of those 
annuities and supplies required to honor previously 
negotiated treaties authorized by Congress. Agents were 
19Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, pp. 2-3. 
18 
also required to undertake "civilizing" the Indians through 
the use of government sponsored educational and agricultural 
training methods and programs. These programs became 
increasingly important and desirable as the government 
confined greater numbers of tribesmen on the 
reservations .20 
Although the President of the United States appointed 
both Indian superintendents and agents with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, he could not establish new Indian 
superintendencies. An Act of June 30, 1834, specifically 
authorized the creation of certain superintendencies and 
agencies.21 This woefully inadequate legislation provided 
for only one full time Indian Superintendent, who was to 
reside in St. Louis, Missouri, "...for all the Indian 
country not within the bounds of any state or Territory west 
of the Mississippi River.." and only two agents for the 
Western Territory.22 Significantly, the act did not grant 
the President the power to create either new 
superintendencies or agencies, but rather allowed him to 
decrease the number and/or change their locals as he deemed 
20Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, pp. 1-2. 
21The Act of June 30, 1834 is printed in its entirety in 
"The Commissioner of Indian Affairs Report" 1837 House 
Executive Documents no 3, 25 Cong., 2d sess., Serial 321, pp. 
648-58 . 
22Ibid., p. 665. 
19 
necessary.23 
The Office of Indian Affairs circumvented the 
restrictions the Act of June 30, 1834, by creating 
subagencies, which did not require Congressional approval. 
In effect, subagents acted as regular agents, but there were 
some "technical" differences. The subagencies were assigned 
to agencies, not superintendencies, and the subagents 
received half of the $1500 annual salary paid to a full 
agent.24 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs could 
establish additional agencies by creating "special 
agencies." Special Agents often carried out a specific 
assignment, such as a treaty signing mission; but in other 
cases they were simply regular agents, placed in charge of 
their own Indian agency, and appointed in addition to 
circumvent, the established quota of agents.25 
The Congressional decision to combine both the 
administrative duties of territorial governor and 
superintendent of Indian affairs into one office resulted in 
a monetary savings to the federal government, but at the 
same time it created anomalies and confusion within the 
hierarchy of the government's bureaucracy. It created the 
23Ibid., p. 656. 
24Ibid., p. 655. 
25Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 2 
20 
awkward situation of requiring the territorial governors to 
report to two different federal administrators. In their 
capacity as territorial governors, they reported indirectly 
to the President through the Secretary of State. Strictly 
a matter of protocol, this practice continued until 1867, 
when Secretary of State William Seward ordered all 
territorial business addressed directly to the State 
Department, not the White House.26 
As ex-officio Superintendent of Indian affairs, 
however, territorial governors first reported to the 
Secretary of War and later to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. Submitting written reports to an underling, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, must have rankled the 
political sensitivities of a number of territorial 
governors. The commissioner of Indian affairs reported 
directly to the Secretary of the Interior, who headed one of 
the more junior government departments, and as territorial 
governor, the same official reported directly to the 
Secretary of State, who headed the oldest government 
department. This system created an uncomfortable anomaly 
that required the territorial governor, to report to the 
commissioner of Indian affairs, an inferior in the 
government's hierarchy and protocol in the governor's 
26Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, p. 10. 
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capacity as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs. 
Such an arrangement undoubtedly established the idea that 
the duties of ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs 
were of less importance and value than those matters 
pertaining to the office of territorial governor.27 
The root of the conflict between whites and the 
tribesmen lay in the possession or use of land. Effective 
territorial governors promoted, or boosted, their 
territories to encourage settlement, development, and, 
ultimately, statehood. Boosterism, however, did not 
preserve peaceful relations with local tribal communities, 
but encouraged conflict between the tasks of administrating 
white men's affairs while maintaining the rights of Indians 
often came into conflict with one another. To many 
westerners, the Indian personified the impediment to culture 
and civilization. Much as nature and the wilderness itself, 
the tribesman became an obstacle that had to be overcome if 
27The annual reports territorial governors submitted to 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs were the main liaison 
between the territorial governors as ex-officio 
superintendents and Washington, D.C. Over the years, the 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs did not give territorial 
governors discretionary guidelines for writing these annual 
reports. Each governor was expected to prepare reports 
containing as much detail as possible, including a census, and 
description of tribal lifestyle and culture. The completeness 
of each annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
ultimately depended upon the individual governor's discretion, 
talent, concern, and ability, or any combination of these 
factors. See Neil, "The Territorial Governor as Indian 
Superintendent" pp. 213-214. 
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progress and civilization were to flourish. The whites 
coveted Indian lands, and the governor/ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs usually abandoned the 
Indian's best interests for that of the white 
constituent's.28 Self-interest dictated that the governor 
concentrate on his territorial duties, since the potential 
rewards, such as a seat in the U.S. Senate, were both 
obvious and greater. Unfortunately, these duties were 
almost always accomplished to the detriment of his duties as 
ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs. 
Fiscal problems constantly influenced a territorial 
governor's political decisions to either abandon or to 
minimize their duties as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs. Financial concerns plagued territorial governors, 
and the federal government slowly and often reluctantly 
disbursed those funds slated for the territories. Further 
complicating this matter was the fact that all forms of 
currency, other than hard specie, was accepted at a discount 
on the frontier. Senator James W. Nye, former Territorial 
Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for 
Nevada from March 22, 1861 through July 18, 1865, testified 
on the floor of the Senate that the federal funds he 
28For a discussion of the conflicts between politics and 
Indian affairs see Pomeroy, The Territories and the United 
States and William M. Neil "The Territorial Governor as Indian 
Superintendent". 
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received to operate his territory and Indian superintendency 
was accepted at the discounted rate of thirty-eight cents on 
the dollar.29 Matters improved in this respect, but as 
late as 18 66, U.S. Indian Agent Augustus S. Chapman at the 
Flathead Reservation in the Montana Territory complained 
that government checks drawn on a San Francisco bank were 
devalued thirty percent; those drawn on Virginia City or 
Helena twenty percent; and greenbacks, or government script, 
were discounted ten percent.30 
The territorial governor ran into financial 
difficulties for two reasons. First, the territorial 
governor dispersed all territorial funds, but only the 
territorial secretary possessed the authority to write money 
drafts on the territorial account. Second, the Federal 
Government niggardly dispersed funds from its coffers, and 
the territorial governor often attempted to perform the 
Herculean tasks imposed by his office without the benefit of 
clerks to assist him with his Indian superintendency duties. 
If the territorial governors had a clerk assigned to assist 
him in the administration of Indian affairs, the clerk's 
29The Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2d sess. No. 176. 
p. 2801. 
301866 House Executive Document no. 1, 39th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1284, "Annual Report of the Flathead Agency," p. 
316. 
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salary often came from the governor's private funds.31 
During the 1870's, the Federal Government gradually 
discontinued superintendencies. The last combined 
territorial governors/ex-officio superintendencies of 
Wyoming, Dakota and Colorado were discontinued in 1871 under 
the territorial governors. After that date, Indian agents 
were appointed who reported directly to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs.32 Then, the Montana Superintendency was 
abolished on June 30, 1873, and by 1878, the last 
superintendency, a bureaucratic anachronism whose usefulness 
had expired, finally ceased to exist. From that time 
forward, all Indian agents submitted their reports directly 
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Office of Indian 
Affairs, in Washington, D.C. However, inspectors and 
special agents were occasionally granted supervisory powers 
over agents when conditions warranted - usually following 
the aftermath of an Indian uprising.33 
The Indian Superintendency constituted one bureaucratic 
level of the Indian Service. The government created the 
Indian Bureau to conduct policy with the tribesmen, and 
especially to deal with displaced people on reservations. 
31Neil, "The Territorial Governor", p. 216. 
32Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, p. 18. 
33Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 3. 
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The Indian Bureau also utilized its field agents as 
negotiators (Congress used treaties to gain title to the 
tribesmen's lands.) There was little doubt that whites 
would take the land held by the Indians. Employing treaties 
to secure this end perhaps soothed the country's conscience 
by cloaking such seizure in a neat, legal blanket; however, 
the government's use of war as an alternative to diplomacy 
left the Indians without any alternatives other than 
surrender or extinction. The treaty system was flawed, as 
Congress did not feel the same obligation to honor tribal 
treaties as they did with those signed with foreign 
powers .34 
In spite of the difficulties in reconciling the 
conflicting duties inherent in their roles as territorial 
governor and ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs, 
some early territorial governors conducted both 
administrative offices effectively through an inherent 
ability that allowed them to separate their two duties and 
distinguish between their two roles. 
Arthur St. Clair, William Henry Harrison, and William 
Clark were among several early ex-officio superintendents of 
Indian affairs who conducted their dual responsibilities in 
a statesmanlike manner. Arthur St. Clair became the United 
34Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West, pp. 42-
45. 
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States' first territorial governor when, on October 5, 1787, 
he reluctantly acquiesced to those in Congress who urged him 
to accept the appointment as Governor of the Northwest 
Territory. A Major General during the Revolutionary War, 
St. Clair served as Pennsylvania's Delegate to the 
Confederation Congress from November 17 85 to November 17 87. 
In February 1787, St. Clair was elected President of the 
Confederation Congress, and his tenure in that capacity 
witnessed Congress pass in July the Ordinance of 1787 that 
established the framework of government for the Northwest 
Territory.35 St. Clair also became the nation's first ex-
of f icio superintendent of Indian affairs when on September 
11, 1789, Congress passed legislation granting an annual 
salary of $2,000 be paid to the Governor of the Northwest 
Territory as compensation for his duties as superintendent 
of Indian affairs.36 
The Northwest Territory was a geographically defined as 
the area that comprised all or parts of the current States 
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota. The United States gained sovereignty over the 
35Thomas A. McMullin and David Walker, Biographical 
Directory of American Territorial Governors, (Westport, Ct: 
Meckler Publishing, 1984.) p. 261. 
36U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 1776—March 2, 
1799), "An Act for establishing the Salaries of the Executive 
Officers of the Government with their Assistants and Clerks," 
p. 68. 
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area by terms of the Treaty of Paris (1783) that ended 
hostilities between the United States and Great Britain. 
While it made great territorial gains, the new nation at the 
same time inherited the Indian problems that had plagued 
Great Britain in the region. In 17 63, reacting to the 
successful Indian Confederacy put together by Chief Pontiac, 
the British reaffirmed Indian rights and title to all the 
territory west of the Appalachian Mountains. In the early 
1760's, King George Ill's government enacted laws to 
prohibit settlers from immigrating into the area, to prevent 
expensive Indian Wars. The British government passed 
legislation that negated all colonial land claims beyond the 
Appalachian Mountains and established the Proclamation Line 
of 17 63, which forbade colonists from entering the area west 
of the Appalachians until a more effective Indian policy 
could be developed. This became the first major grievance 
the colonists harbored against British rule after the French 
and Indian War. This grievance and others eventually led to 
the American Revolutionary War.37 
Between 1784 and 1786, the United States dictated a 
series of treaties with those Indians who had claims in what 
is now eastern and southern Ohio. The American treaty 
37Robert Kelley, The Shaping of the American Past, Vol. 
1, 4th Edition, Teacher's Edition. (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, Inc.) p. 90. 
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"negotiators", accompanied by an intimidating military 
escort, informed the Indians that Great Britain had ceded 
the property that they now inhabited and announced that the 
United States was now prepared to allow them to retain 
possession of some of their lands. The Indians were bullied 
into signing these treaties and did not understand the terms 
"sovereignty" and "right of soil." Under these 
circumstances, they refused to abide by the treaty terms and 
commenced raiding white settlements, with British 
encouragement.38 
The Northwest Ordinance provided a framework of 
government for the Northwest Territory. Previously, the 
area possessed very few settlers. Passage of this Ordinance 
opened the area to white immigration and settlement, which 
increased hostilities between the tribesmen and the whites. 
Confronted with escalating Indian depredations and an 
impecunious treasury, the Articles of Confederation 
Government decided to treat the different tribes as 
sovereign nations and negotiate treaties with them rather 
than launch a series of expensive military campaigns. In 
January, 1789, two treaties were signed at Fort Harmer, 
Northwest Territory. These reaffirmed the land cessions 
38Reginald Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years: 
1783 - 1815, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1975.) pp. 35-36. 
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from the previous treaties. This time, however, the 
government paid the signatory tribes $9,000. Many tribes in 
the area either did not sign or disavowed the Fort Harmer 
Treaties, and hostilities resumed at a more heated pace than 
before; the Territorial Capital at Marietta was reduced to 
little more than a besieged camp.39 Although the Fort 
Harmer Treaties can only be considered an unmitigated 
failure, their implementation marked the beginning of the 
Government's quixotic "treaty/annuity11 policy when it 
negotiated with Indian tribes. This policy approached 
Indian relations with the confusing assumption that these 
Indian "nations" inhabited the same land that the United 
States claimed sovereignty over, a policy the federal 
government followed until 1871.40 
Heeding the appeals for help from the war ravaged 
settlers in the Northwest Territory, the new, more powerful 
Constitutional Government flexed its military muscles and 
sent an armed punitive expedition in two columns against the 
hostile Indians. One column numbered some 1,500 regular and 
militia troops was placed under the command of General 
Josiah Harmar. It struck north from Fort Washington, now 
Cincinnati. The western arm of the attack, 300 troopers 
39Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years, pp. 39-40. 
40Kelley, The Shaping of the American Past, p. 133. 
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strong, was to march from Vincennes under the command of 
Major John Francis Hamtramck. All military operations were 
planned in consultation with Territorial Governor and ex-
of f icio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Arthur St. Clair. 
The campaign achieved nothing. Harmar split his command and 
lost 180 men in piecemeal actions. Hamtramck never found 
the Indians he was after. The Indians, buoyed by their 
success and supplied by the British in Detroit, increased 
their depredations.41 
In October, 17 91, the Government again attempted to use 
military force to bring order to the area, when in October 
of that year, Arthur St. Clair lead a large force northward 
from Fort Washington. St. Clair spent one month moving his 
command one hundred miles, only to have it routed by the 
Indians with a loss of 600 men. The survivors fled back to 
Fort Washington in a matter of days. Known as the "Battle 
of No Name," this debacle was the worst defeat ever suffered 
by an American army at the hands if the Indians.42 Only 
after General "Mad" Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians at 
the Battle of Fallen Timbers on August 20, 1794, and the 
signing of the Treaty of Greenville in August 17 95 did the 
41Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years, p. 49. 
42John Hoyt Williams, "Defeated Army In Shame" Military 
History, Volume 5, Number 3 (December 1988) pp. 19-24. 
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area become safe for white settlement.43 
Arthur St. Clair, a staunch Federalist, remained 
Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Iiidian 
Affairs for the Northwest Territory until President Thomas 
Jefferson, a Republican, removed him from office on November 
22, 1802, for partisan political reasons. The Northwest 
Territory was heavily Republican, and St. Clair tried to 
keep the area from entering the Union and providing 
additional votes for the Republicans. After his removal, 
the governorship fell to the territorial secretary, Charles 
W. Boyd, who served as Acting Governor until Congress 
created the State of Ohio on March 1, 1803.44 
Arthur St. Clair's tenure as the Northwest Territory's 
Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs set many precedents that would guide the 
government's policies throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century in its implementation of Indian policy. 
Perhaps the most important policy established during the 
years St. Clair was territorial governor/ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs was the precedent that 
white expansion into the frontier would be at the expense of 
43McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, p. 2 62. 
44McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, p. 2 63. 
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Indian land title. The government preferred to use treaties 
and annuities to secure title to Indian lands, but proved it 
was not beyond the use of military force if a tribe proved 
recalcitrant, refused to sign a treaty, or, worse yet, broke 
an existing one. During St. Clair's tenure, for the first 
time these two disparate and conflicting offices were 
combined under the aegis of a single official when Congress 
joined the offices of territorial governor and 
superintendent of Indian Affairs. Designed with the hope of 
avoiding similar costly Indian wars such as those St. Clair 
undertook, Congress formulated the "treaty/annuity" plan in 
order to secure title to Indian lands, and passed a series 
of laws, in 1796, 1799, and 1802, "to regulate trade and 
intercourse with the Indian tribes.".45 During the 
Northwest Territory experience, in the early years of the 
Republic, there developed a recurrent pattern that defined 
Indian-white relationships on the frontier. First, a treaty 
would be signed to turn Indian land title over to the 
whites. Then, the area would experience white immigration. 
The terms of the treaty would be broken by either the 
tribesmen or the whites, which led to Indian attacks on 
white settlements. After which, the settlers would call on 
the government to provide military protection. An Indian 
45Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 44-45, 50. 
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war would ensue, and upon the war's conclusion, a new peace 
treaty was signed, which often required the tribesmen to 
cede more of their lands.46 
William Henry Harrison, also typified the early breed 
of territorial governors. A scion of an aristocratic 
Virginian family and later the ninth President of the United 
States, he served as the first Territorial Governor and ex-
of f icio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory 
of Indiana from 1801 to 1812.47 
Using his family's connections, Harrison secured a 
commission in the army, and in 1792 was stationed at Fort 
Washington, Northwest Territory, in what is now Ohio. He 
served as Aide-de-Camp to General Anthony Wayne and served 
in Wayne's campaigns against the Shawnee, fighting in the 
Battle of Fallen Timbers, and participated in the signing of 
the Treaty of Greenville which opened much of the area to 
white settlement. After resigning his army commission in 
June 17 98, he accepted an appointment as Territorial 
46See, for example, Philip Weeks, ed., The American Indian 
Experience; A Profile, Arlington Heights, Illinois: Forum, 
1988), pp. 81-189, passim and Frederick E. Hoxie, ed., Indians 
in American History, Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan 
Davidson, 1988), particularly the essays "Indian/White 
Relations: A View From The Other Side of The 'Frontier'" by 
Alfonso Ortiz; "National Expansion from the Indian 
Perspective" by David Edmonds; and "How the West was Lost" by 
William T. Hagan. 
47McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, p. 14 9. 
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Secretary of the Northwest Territory and worked in that 
capacity under Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair. He 
used the Territorial Secretaryship as a platform to become 
to Congressional delegate, after defeating Arthur St. 
Clair's son by the narrowest of margins, one vote. As 
Territorial Delegate, he chaired a committee on public lands 
and was instrumental in passing the Harrison Land Act in 
1800. This important legislation liberalized the terms 
governing a citizen's purchase of frontier lands and 
accelerated the influx of white farmers into the 
frontier.48 
Harrison recognized the problems inherent in the size 
of the Northwest Territory, and his ideas led to the 
creation of a separate Indiana Territory which included the 
parts of western Michigan, eastern Minnesota, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Wisconsin. President John Adams appointed 
Harrison as Territorial Governor and ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs to the new Territory of 
Indiana on May 13, 1800 .49 
During Harrison's early years in office, he encountered 
difficulties in discharging his duties in preparing Indiana 
Territory for statehood while at the same time serving as 
48McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, pp. 149-150. 
49Ibid., p. 149. 
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the guardian of the Territory's Indians, forced him to 
confront a myriad of important issues. An able 
administrator, he quickly tackled the problem of 
lawlessness, streamlined the militia, and reorganized the 
judiciary in Indiana Territory. He also took measures to 
defuse the volatile problem of slavery in the Territory. 
However, all of these major and important issues paled in 
importance compared to the Indian issues. The Indians, 
under the brilliant leadership of Shawnee Chief Tecumseh and 
his brother Tenskwatawa, also known as the Prophet, built a 
powerful tribal coalition that would not only sorely test 
Harrison's diplomatic and military skills but, as allies of 
the British in the War of 1812, posed a serious threat to 
America's sovereignty over its frontier.50 
Tecumseh and the Prophet made their historical 
appearance in 1807. The Prophet was an Indian shaman who 
preached resistance to the white man's ways and desired a 
return to the old Indian ways. Tecumseh was a 
political/military leader, determined to stop any further 
white encroachment into Indian territory. Tecumseh claimed 
that no one tribe could sell Indian lands; all the tribes 
50For a discussion of the problems associated with white 
immigration into Indian lands during this period, see David 
Edmonds, The Shawnee Prophet, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1983). Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership, 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1984). 
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had to be a party to any sale, or the transaction was 
rendered invalid. Armed and encouraged by the British 
(relations between America and Great Britain steadily 
worsened after the Chesapeake Affair in 1807), Tecumseh 
built the most powerful and effective tribal confederation 
to confront America's western expansion since the time of 
Pontiac nearly fifty years before. The problems the 
Americans thought were resolved by the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers and the Treaty of Greenville were resurrected, and 
Indian relations in Indiana and Illinois steadily worsened 
from 1806 through 1812.51 
Despite increased Indian hostility and militancy, on 
September 30, 1809, Harrison concluded a treaty and land 
sale at Fort Wayne with the Miamis, Weas, and Delaware 
Tribes. Although Shawnee lands were not involved, Tecumseh 
held to his stated views of not selling any more land to the 
whites and viewed the Fort Wayne Treaty and subsequent land 
sale with great alarm. (Tecumseh, while visiting Harrison 
at the Territorial capitol in Vincennes in 1810, threatened 
Harrison with military reprisals, and declared the Treaty of 
Fort Wayne invalid.) A temporary truce prevented war, but 
the following summer, the two antagonists met again at 
51Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States 
Government and the American Indians, vol. 1 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1984.) pp 76-77. 
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Harrison's estate in Vincennes. When this meeting ended, 
Tecumseh announced his intention to bring the southern 
tribes into his confederacy.52 
Harrison, with a force of regular and militia troops, 
moved towards the Prophet's village in September 1811, with 
the intention of with negotiating the tribesmen. The 
Indians rejected Harrison's efforts at diplomacy, and, on 
November 7th, they attacked his column. The Indians were 
repulsed, but only at the cost of heavy American casualties. 
The Battle of Tippicanoe, written in Harrison's official 
report as an overwhelming victory for America, accomplished 
very little in terms of bringing peace to the frontier.53 
However, the battle established Harrison as an Indian 
fighter and that served him well as a platform plank and 
part of a campaign slogan that launched him into the White 
House thirty-nine years later.54 
The tribesmen proved their worth as British allies in 
the War of 1812. Initially, America suffered serious 
defeats on its frontier, including the surrender of an 
entire army in Detroit. Only after Admiral Oliver Hazard 
52Prucha, The Great Father, vol. 1, p. 77. 
"Harrison's report to the Secretary of War on the Battle 
of Tippicanoe can be read in David A. Durfee, ed., W. H. 
Harrison: 1773-1844/ J. Tyler: 1790-1862, (Dobbs Ferry, NY: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970) pp. 15-21. 
54Prucha, The Great Father, vol. 1, pp. 77-78. 
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Perry secured the Great Lakes was Territorial Governor/Major 
General William Henry Harrison able to defeat the British 
and their Indian allies at the Battle of the Thames on 
October 5, 1813. This battle, although a marginal military 
victory for the Americans, proved disastrous for the Indians 
when Tecumseh was killed in the fighting. The tribesmen 
never recovered from this loss, and Tecumseh's mighty tribal 
confederacy died with him.55 
The Treaty of Ghent, signed on December 24, 1814, ended 
the War of 1812. The United States in its desire to impress 
upon the Indians that the British had ceded all claims to 
the old Northwest, sent commissions among the tribes to 
ensure that the tribesmen understood that no further British 
assistance would be forthcoming. In order to ensure peace, 
the War Department established a series of forts from 
Chicago to St. Louis. A peace treaty signed at Spring Wells 
on September 8, 1815 reaffirmed peace between the tribes and 
the United States and pardoned those Indians who continued 
hostilities after 1811.56 
Harrison's later career reflected on the quality of his 
leadership. He resigned his governorship in May 1813, after 
a dispute with Secretary of War John Armstrong, and later 
55Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
56Ibid., p. 82. 
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served as a State Senator in Ohio, a bank director, a United 
States Senator, Minister to Columbia. He capitalized on his 
experiences as territorial governor and the fame won as an 
Indian fighter. In 1840, he successfully ran for President 
of the United States employing one of the first successful 
campaign slogans, "Tippicanoe and Tyler Too!"57 As 
Superintendent of Indian affairs, Harrison performed better 
than most. One need not admire all of his policies to 
appreciate the integrity and competence he brought to the 
office. 
The defeat of Mexico and the settlement of the Oregon 
question with Great Britain enlarged the physical size of 
the nation and dramatically increased the numbers of 
tribesmen under its jurisdiction. These increases rendered 
the Act of June 30, 1834 obsolete. Congress was compelled 
to enact new legislation that would expand the number of 
superintendencies and agencies to meet the new needs of the 
nation. 
In his Annual Report of 1849, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Orlando Brown, pointed out the problems 
created by the government's underfunding the Office of 
Indian Affairs and the need for more efficient 
administrative control over these newly acquired 
57McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, p. 151. 
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territories. Brown believed these two problems blocked the 
effective implementation of Indian policy. When the 
jurisdiction of Texas, Oregon, California, and New Mexico, 
fell to the United States, the number of superintendencies, 
still at the level of 1834, proved inadequate. When 
Congress passed the Act of 1834, it authorized the 
establishment of five positions of Superintendents of Indian 
Affairs. Of these five, two were local agents for 
particular tribes. These two agents, called "acting 
superintendents" were expected to perform, without any 
increase of compensation, the duties of superintendents as 
well as agents.58 
Commissioner Brown made the specific point that the 
others, the Territorial Governors of Oregon and Minnesota, 
also held the posts of ex-officio Superintendents of Indian 
Affairs, thus inferring that they were overwhelmed by their 
responsibilities. Commissioner Brown believed that the 
territorial governors were inadequately compensated for 
their extra duties as Indian Superintendents "...for which 
they are allowed, the one fifteen hundred, the other one 
thousand dollars per annum, in addition to their salaries as 
governors." He complained of the lack in the numbers of 
581849 Senate Executive Document no. 1, 31st Congress, 1st 
Session, Serial 550, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs", p. 952. 
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superintendencies and noted the existence of only one full 
and independent superintendent, located in St. Louis, 
Missouri. Accordingly he recommended the establishment of 
seven "full and independent" Indian superintendencies. His 
suggested plan centered on the creation of four 
superintendencies for the Indians east of the Mississippi 
including Texas, and three for the Territories of Oregon, 
California, and New Mexico. This plan, he argued, "... 
would supersede the necessity of governors acting as 
superintendents. "59 
As Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Brown dealt with 
political appointees rather than officers of the caliber of 
St. Clair and Harrison. Brown offered two major criticisms 
concerning the operation of the Superintendent of Indian 
affairs. He disliked the system which allowed the governor 
to locate his residence away from the Indians. He also 
expressed the opinion that a territory's superintendent of 
Indian affairs should be a permanent appointment, because 
the governor's position would terminate when the territory 
achieved statehood. This lack of continuity created a 
situation in the Indian Bureau "...always producing changes 
inconvenient, embarrassing, and injurious."60 
59Ibid., p. 953. 
60Ibid., pp. 952-53. 
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Due to the lobbying efforts of such men as Orlando 
Brown, Congress provided for an expanded and different 
arrangement between existing superintendencies and agencies. 
The Act of February 27, 1851 increased the number of Indian 
superintendencies east of the Rocky Mountains, and north of 
New Mexico and Texas to three while decreasing the number of 
agents and subagents in the same area from twenty-three to 
seventeen.61 This reshuffling of superintendencies and 
agencies, remained woefully inadequate to administer Indian 
affairs on the American frontier properly. 
The American Western Territories were the beneficiaries 
of the Act of February 27, 1851. Into the expanded number 
of Indian superintendencies Congress appointed both famous 
territorial governors, as well as a cadre of political hacks 
who secured their appointments through the political 
patronage system. Brigham Young of Utah, Isaac Stevens of 
Washington, were representative of the former, and Caleb 
Lyon of Idaho was typical of the latter. All served as 
examples of later Territorial Governors and ex-officio 
Superintendents of Indian Affairs. The experience of this 
later group preceded the Montana experience, but their story 
provided insights into what would later take place in 
61Francis Paul Prucha, Documents of United States Indian 
Policy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) pp. 83-
84 . 
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Montana. Politics, finances, and Indian policy constantly 
conflicted with the territorial governor's ability 
adequately to perform their duties as ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs.62 
Young's experience as both territorial governor and ex-
of f icio superintendent of Indian affairs demonstrated that 
the combined administrative positions were at odds with one 
another. When President Millard Fillmore signed the Organic 
Act of September 9, 1850 that created the Territory of Utah, 
he appointed "Gentiles" to the offices of the territory's 
secretary, judges, marshall and district attorney, but 
reserved the governorship for the Head of the Church of 
Latter Day Saints. President Fillmore recognized that Young 
had the total allegiance of his people. This was crucial in 
that many Mormons opposed organizing into a territory 
because they believed they would be subjected to far less 
bigotry and persecution in a unorganized province than in a 
political unit under Congressional control. Retaining Young 
as the territorial governor would reduce their fears.63 
Brigham Young was a capable leader. As such, he also 
understood the government's interest in carrying out Indian 
62Neil, "The Territorial Governor as Indian 
Superintendent," pp. 216-219. 
63Norman F. Furness, The Mormon Conflict: 1850 - 1859, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.) pp. 10-11. 
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policy as efficiently as possible. However, this 
understanding did not prevent him from asking for more money 
to carry out his plans of Indian pacification in Utah 
Territory. He laced his Annual Report to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs, George W. Manypenny, in 1855, with 
phrases such as "the small amount of expenditures", "The 
cheap rate at which these results have been attained," and 
"Advocating a course not only the least expensive to the 
general government...", to describe the economical means he 
used to implement Indian policy.64 
Although Young paid lip service to the Federal 
Government's desire to run Indian affairs as cheaply as 
possible, he recognized that the funding allocated by the 
Federal Government to run Indian affairs in his 
superintendency was inadequate. This realization prompted 
Young to request more funds from the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. In his Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Young wrote: 
You will at once perceive that not only myself, 
but the subordinate officers of this 
superintendency, find it impossible, as proven by 
our united and best endeavors and judgements, to 
carry out your admirable policy — which we all 
happily coincide with — except at considerable 
expense; hence may I not rely upon your powerful 
mediation with the next Congress for 
641855 Senate Executive Document no. 1, 34th Congress, 1st 
Session, Serial 810, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Report from Utah Territory" p. 516-517. 
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appropriations commensurate with the justice of 
the case and the magnanimity of our nation?65 
Young also complained about the burdens placed on him 
in his dual capacity as both the Territorial Governor and 
ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah. He 
believed his salary did not pay commensurate with the work 
involved. He wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
suggesting that "...inasmuch as I perform the duties of both 
offices, I am entitled to the pay appropriated for it, and 
trust that you will so considerate it."66 
As might be expected, his call for more pay landed on 
deaf ears. Indeed, Commissioner of Indian Affairs James W. 
Denver had reached the end of his patience with Governor 
Young and his constant requests for more funds. In a letter 
to Governor Young, Denver responded with the following 
literary salvo aimed at Salt Lake City: 
Sir: Your communication of the 12th of last 
September has been received, and would not require 
a formal reply were it not for the effort you make 
to place this office in the wrong, when, in fact, 
whatever difficulties exist have resulted from 
your own conduct. 
Your claim for double salary cannot be 
allowed; for even if it did not come in conflict 
with the general rule which forbids the payment of 
two salaries at the same time to the same person, 
yet you could not be entitled to it, for the 
65Ibid., p. 516 
661857 Senate Executive Document no. 11, 35th Congress, 
1st Session, Serial 919. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 600 
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reason that you became superintendent of Indian 
affairs by virtue of your appointment as governor 
of the Territory; and although these offices have 
since been separated, yet you had not, at the date 
of your communication, been relieved of the duties 
appertaining to them.67 
In July 1857, Brigham Young's tenure as Territorial 
Governor of Utah ended when President James Buchanan 
replaced him with the appointment of Alfred Cumming during 
the "Mormon War."68 On September 9, 1857, Jacob Forney was 
appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah, and 
Young's argument that the office should be split became a 
reality, but too late for him to benefit. After its 
experience with Young, Congress separated the office of 
superintendent of Indian affairs from the office of 
territorial governor in Utah.69 
67Ibid., Letter from James W. Denver to Governor Brigham 
Young. November 11, 1857. 
68Rumors had reached Washington D.C that the Mormans in 
Utah were in open rebellion against the United States. 
President James Buchanan sent 1,500 Federal troops with orders 
to march on Salt Lake City to restore federal authority to the 
"treasonous" Territory of Utah. Enroute, some brief skirmishes 
occurred, but major battles in the so called "Morman War" 
(Spring 1857 - Spring 1858) were avoided. The affair ended 
abruptly when Buchanan reversed himself and pardoned the 
Mormon leaders. With that, the Mormons allowed the troops to 
pass through, but not encamp, in Salt Lake in June 1857. See 
Furness, The Mormon Conflict: 1850 - 1859, or Stanley 
Hirshon's biography of Brigham Young, The Lion of the Lord 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.) p. 102. 
691858 House Executive Document no. 2, 35th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 997, "Annual Report of the Utah Superintendent" 
p. 561. 
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As ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, the 
territorial governor sometimes negotiated treaties with the 
Indians within his jurisdiction. Some territorial 
governors, such as Washington Territory's Isaac I. Stevens, 
entered these treaty meetings fully prepared and armed with 
knowledge of the Indian's culture and desires and a full 
vision of the treaty's importance to expansion. A talented 
thirty-five year old, blessed with phenomenal physical 
stamina, Governor Stevens, a general, explorer, cartographer 
and accomplished artist, demonstrated that one man, albeit 
an extraordinary one, could accomplish the duties of 
territorial governor and ex-officio superintendent of Indian 
affairs.70 
On March 2, 1853, in the waning days of his Presidency, 
Millard Fillmore signed the Enabling Act that created 
Washington Territory. Although territorial governorships 
were generally considered a second rate political position, 
Stevens, to the disbelief of his friends and associates, 
actively sought the position. An ambitious man, Stevens 
70For an account of Isaac Stevens, see Kent D. Richards, 
Isaac I. Stevens: Young Man In A Hurry (Provo, Utah: Brigham 
Young University Press, 1979) . Also see the biography written 
by his son, Hazard Stevens, The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens 
Vol. 1 & 2. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1901) . Although 
understandably biased in his opinion of his father's 
accomplishments, the latter biography's value lies in the 
extensive record of events that took place at the Indian 
councils from 1854-1859. 
48 
believed that as Washington Territory's Territorial Governor 
and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, he could 
become the spokesman for the Pacific Northwest, much in the 
same way Harrison and Thomas Hart Benton became associated 
with their respective regions of the Nation. Having sown 
the political seeds to secure his appointment by actively 
campaigning for Franklin Pierce's successful presidential 
bid, Stevens' nomination was approved on March 17, 1852.71 
In addition, Stevens applied to Secretary of War 
Jefferson Davis to lead the northern transcontinental 
railroad route survey while enroute to Olympia, Washington 
Territory.72 Railroad surveys, contrary to what the name 
implies, were broad in scope. Railroad survey reports, in 
addition to topography, included as much information 
possible concerning such topics as geography, meteorology, 
botany and zoology. As if these tasks were not enough to 
occupy Stevens' energies, Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
George W. Manypenny thought such an expedition would provide 
Stevens with an opportunity "to acquaint the department as 
fully as possible with the condition of Indian affairs in 
71Richards, Isaac I. Stevens, pp. 96-97. 
72War Department Annual Report, 33d Cong., 1st sess., part 
II, p. 20. 
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that quarter."73 
Arriving in Olympia in November 1853, Stevens proceeded 
to set up a territorial government. He then tackled the 
problems of settling those claims the Hudson Bay Company 
still had outstanding with the United States Government. 
Because white immigrants had already flooded into the area 
he recognized the urgent need to sign treaties to gain land 
title and settle the area's Indians onto reservations. A 
careful observer, Stevens noted these Indians were 
profoundly attached to their traditional lands. Because 
most of the area's tribesmen lived by fishing, relocation of 
these tribes to the interior would be impossible. On a 
return trip to Washington D.C. in the spring of 1854, he 
convinced Commissioner Manypenny of the wisdom behind his 
plan to negotiate a number of treaties which would keep the 
Indians on their traditional lands within small, non­
contiguous reservations. Accordingly, Congress appropriated 
$45,000 to negotiate treaties with the Indians in Washington 
Territory as well as an extra $80,000 to fund those expenses 
likely to be incurred to negotiate and to sign a treaty with 
the Blackfeet, Gros Ventres, and other tribes in the area 
731853 House Executive Document no. 1, 33d Cong., 1st 
sess., serial 710, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs," p. 263-4. Manypenny's letter dated May 9, 
1853, detailing instructions and fourteen points to cover can 
be read in it entirety on pp. 453-57.) 
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that would eventually become Montana Territory.74 
Upon Stevens' return to Olympia in December 1854, he 
began a whirlwind Indian treaty signing mission. From the 
winter of 1854 through the autumn of 1855, the energetic 
Stevens managed to secure title to an area of settlement 
from the Puget Sound to beyond the border of Washington 
Territory and the jurisdiction of his Indian 
Superintendency.75 He was especially interested in signing 
treaties with the Blackfeet in the area that would 
eventually become Montana Territory. Stevens hoped to pave 
the way for a railroad through their lands and to remove 
them as a military threat to those tribesmen within the 
Washington Superintendency.76 
Accordingly, on October 17, 1855, Stevens signed the 
Judith River Treaty with the Blackfeet tribes. Under the 
terms of the Treaty, the Blackfeet were not to establish any 
permanent villages south of a line drawn ten miles north of 
the Musselshell River, so that these lands, to the 
Yellowstone, could be used in commonality by western tribes 
to hunt buffalo. In return, the Blackfeet received 
74Prucha, The Great Father, vol. 1, p. 403. 
75Ibid., pp. 404-406. 
76Richards, Isaac I. Stevens, p. 115. 
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annuities .77 
As a testimony to his abilities in carrying out these 
difficult duties from the government's standpoint, Stevens 
received a glowing review from the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, George W. Manypenny. In his annual report, 
Manypenny wrote, "...I would refer... to the elaborate 
report of Governor Stevens of Washington, as containing much 
valuable and interesting information in regard to the 
tribes, and the condition of Indian affairs in those two 
Territories."78 Although he may have impressed the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, a closer examination of his 
record reveals some flaws with his handling of Indian 
matters. 
Stevens spoke condescendingly to and held a 
paternalistic attitude towards the Indians; thus the treaty 
negotiations he entered into were not two sided 
negotiations. Stevens' Treaties took the form of dictated 
terms that the tribesmen were cowed or bribed into signing. 
A number of Indian wars soon broke out. In 1855, the Rogue 
River War and the Yakima War broke out in Washington and 
Oregon Territories. The causes of these wars were two-fold. 
77Ibid., p. 232. 
781854 Senate Executive Document no. 1, 33d Cong., 1st 
sess., serial 746, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs", p. 223. 
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Congress dragged its feet ratifying Steven's treaties, and 
the area experienced a large influx of white immigrants. 
These wars dragged on until 1858 when the military power of 
the Indians was finally broken at the Battles of Four Lakes 
and Spokane Plains. American military action achieved it 
desired objectives in Washington and Oregon Territories. 
After the subsequent hanging of those Indian parties 
implicated in inciting attacks, Indians in the region never 
resorted to war to settle their grievances again.79 
The Judith River Treaty has often been credited with 
maintaining peace with the Blackfeet until the Civil War, 
when the pressures of white immigration into the area 
heightened tensions and eroded the peace.80 By 18 64, and 
the formation of Montana Territory, the area was a powder 
keg awaiting a match. 
Some ex-officio superintendents, such as Caleb Lyon, 
Territorial Governor of Idaho from 1864-1866, initiated 
Indian negotiations with little desire of learning anything 
about the Indians under his charge.81 Such ethnocentric 
attitudes almost always resulted in flawed or unworkable 
Indian treaties. The nature of tribal diplomacy was 
79Prucha, The Great Father, pp. 407-408. 
80Richards, Isaac I. Stevens. p. 223. 
81Neil, "The Territorial Governor," p. 223. 
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delicate and difficult. Lengthy in ritual and formality, 
patience was demanded of any successful Indian treaty 
negotiator. Although Lyon negotiated treaties with the 
Boise and Bruneau Shoshoni, Congress never ratified them 
because the whites in Idaho Territory rejected his 
reservation proposals as too generous to the tribesmen.82 
Territorial governors such as Lyons, because they received 
their appointment as a political reward, came to their posts 
ill-trained, ill-prepared, or lacking the temperament to 
enter into such delicate diplomacy. They also lacked the 
training necessary to prepare for the inevitable Indian war 
that followed.83 
Lyon ended his career ignobly by embezzling $46,418 in 
federal funds allocated for the Nez Perce Indians. After 
arriving east and being confronted with the accusation, he 
claimed the money was stolen from his pillow during the 
train trip, which contradicted his previous claim that the 
money never arrived in Idaho. He escaped conviction, and 
retired to a life of writing poetry and collecting art at 
his home "Lyonsmere" on Staten Island.84 
S2Merle W. Wells, "Caleb Lyon's Indian Policy," Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 4, (October 1970) p. 200. 
S3Neil, "The Territorial Governor," p. 223. 
84McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, p. 128. 
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Unfortunately for Indian-American relations, many 
territorial governors were drawn from the ranks of those in 
the ilk of Lyons. Ironically, however, even with honest, 
ambitious men such as Stevens and Young, people possessed 
with good intentions and abilities, their achievements 
differed little from those of incompetent and dishonest 
Lyons. Even good territorial governors and ex-officio 
superintendents of Indian affairs, were thwarted by factors 
beyond their control: a lack of funding, inadequate means to 
implement or enforce federal Indian policy, or their own 
ignorance of their charges. More often than not, many 
territorial governors saw their positions as temporary - a 
steppingstone that would lead to a seat in the United States 
Senate when statehood was achieved. Others were simply 
thieves. Against this backdrop, the Montana experience 
began in 1864. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE: SIDNEY EDGERTON, 1864-66 
During the Civil War, an event occurred that provided 
an impetus for policy change that would eventually culminate 
in a revision of the official relationships between the 
tribesmen and the Federal Government. On a cold and early 
morning on November 29, 1864, Colonel John M. Chivington led 
seven hundred militia troopers of the Third Colorado Cavalry 
into the camp of Black Kettle, a Cheyenne Chief at Sand 
Creek, Colorado. Of five hundred Cheyennes, some two 
hundred (fully two-thirds of whom were women and children) 
died in what could only be termed a massacre. 
In the west, whites lionized Chivington and the men of 
the bloody Third as heroes. It mattered little that Black 
Kettle's band was friendly and that they had received solemn 
promises of government protection. What mattered to most of 
the whites in Colorado and the west was fact that the 
Indians were defeated, revenge was extracted, and, as a 
result of the "battle", a clear message would be sent to all 
tribes to change their ways or suffer the consequences. 
Public opinion in the East, driven by the horror of the Sand 
Creek Massacre, called into question the nation's practice 
of allowing the military, especially local militias, to 
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develop and administer Indian policy. The realities of the 
Civil War, however, mandated that the west would establish 
its own Indian policy with little interference from the 
federal government. This remained so until the inauguration 
of the country's greatest warrior, Ulysses S. Grant, in 1868 
and the enactment of his vaunted Peace Policy.85 
Again, the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864 in the Colorado 
Territory compelled America's reformers to examine the 
nation's treatment of, and improve its policy towards, 
Indian peoples. The Doolittle Commission, the body charged 
with this task, consisted of the then Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Nathaniel Green Taylor; the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, Samuel F. Tappen; former 
general John Sanborn; and three military representatives, 
appointed by President Andrew Johnson: Lieutenant General 
William T. Sherman, Major General William S. Harney, and 
Major General Alfred Terry.86 Simply put, this 
investigative committee provided evidence that the role of 
territorial government in the administration of Indian 
Affairs, needed to be changed. The existing system that 
allowed territorial governors to administer or neglect 
85Robert M. Utley, "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General 
Grant," North Dakota History, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1953. P. 121. 
86Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman & the 
Settlement of the West, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1956) p. 172. 
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Indian affairs as a function of their dual capacities, was 
identified as an area that mandated reform. Although the 
events that led to a questioning of the nation's Indian 
policy took place outside of Montana Territory, the impact 
of the reform movement would exert a great impact upon the 
governors and government of Montana Territory. 
Idaho, in what was to become Montana, experienced gold 
rushes of 1862-63 which upset the fragile balance of 
relations previously established between the American nation 
and the tribesmen based on treaties negotiated in 1851 and 
1855. Montana's gold beckoned to those miners who missed 
the big placer strikes in Colorado and California. Veterans 
from the Union or Confederate armies recently discharged or 
civilians displaced by the ravages of war came by the 
thousands to start over and seek their fortunes. The 
Homestead Act of 1862 allowed many of these immigrants to 
stake their claims to this new land. Thousands of white 
prospectors, merchants, and the usual camp followers 
streamed into the Montana mountains. This white "invasion" 
spilled into or across valuable Indian hunting grounds, and 
tensions increased until the region became plagued by 
isolated violent clashes between the immigrants and the 
tribesmen. The Blackfeet especially felt this influx of 
whites into Montana because the goldfields lay along and 
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below the southern limits of their 1855 reservation.87 
Miners in western Montana, concerned for their lives 
and property and fearing Indian depredations, demanded 
federal military protection. The military not only provided 
protection, but the frontier citizens also benefitted from 
the financial boom that resulted from lucrative government 
contracts required to support the fort and from military 
payrolls, all of which bolstered local economies. 
Regardless of their reasons, westerners' pleas for more 
military protection found support among the lawmakers in 
Washington D.C. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dennis N. 
Cooley, who supported the use of the military as an Indian 
policy enforcement agency, wrote: 
It will thus be seen that the failure to establish 
military posts upon the upper Missouri, together 
with the severe and almost unexampled drought, 
have resulted in an almost complete loss of the 
controlling influence we have heretofore held upon 
the Indians of that country, and that as a 
consequence the important and most direct route of 
the immigration setting in upon Idaho, by reason 
of the newly discovered and immense gold-bearing 
districts of that Territory, is cut off.88 
This "most direct route" the Commissioner referred to 
was the famous Bozeman Trail. Blazed in 1863 by John 
87Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 89. 
88 1 8 6 3 House Executive Document no. 1, 38th Cong., 1st 
sess., serial 1182. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 141. 
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Bozeman and John Jacobs, the Bozemen Trail ran from Deer 
Creek, near present day Casper, Wyoming, to Virginia City, 
Montana,. An offshoot of the Oregon Trail, the Bozeman 
Trails held several attractions for those journeying to the 
goiafieids of Montana. The Bozemen Trail not only provided 
the travelers with a route that bypassed the rugged Rocky 
Mountains, but the lush and fertile grassland along the 
trail also provided the necessary forage required by the 
goldseeker's livestock and draught animals. However, 
travel along the Bozeman Trail also proved dangerous, as it 
crossed the prime hunting grounds of the Sioux, Northern 
Cheyenne, and Blackfeet tribes. These mobile hunters 
required large tracts of land to continue their way of life. 
The immediate past had demonstrated to these Indians that 
wherever white men traveled or settled, firewood and forage 
grew scarce and the buffalo disappeared. As a result, these 
tribes strongly resisted white encroachment, and quite often 
this resistance manifested itself in violence. Indeed, the 
Bozeman Trail experienced a violent baptism when the first 
wagon train to attempt to travel on the Bozeman Trail, led 
by John Bozeman, was turned back by the Sioux short of its 
intended destination of Virginia City. As a result of this, 
and other fierce clashes, the trail soon became known as 
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"The Bloody Bozeman."89 
With the end of the Civil War in April 1865, the nation 
once again looked west to the frontier. After many years of 
neglect, government funds once again became available, and 
western matters gained a renewed priority in Washington. As 
part of its plan to protect white immigrants using the 
Bozeman Trail, the government established two forts in 1866. 
One was the short lived Camp Cooke at the mouth of the 
Judith River, 100 miles down the Missouri from Fort Benton, 
the other Fort C.F. Smith on the Big Horn River. The 
following year, the government constructed Fort Ellis and 
Fort Shaw, the two major military bases on the mining 
frontier.90 Fort Shaw's position on the Sun River crossing 
near the Mullan Road, enabled the military to intercept any 
hostile Blackfeet Indians who intended to raid the southern 
mining camps. Fort Ellis, built on the western side of the 
Bozeman Pass near the town of Bozeman, shielded the 
southeastern flank of the goldfields from those Sioux 
operating out of the Yellowstone Valley.91 
In an attempt to end the violence between the whites 
89For an account of the history of the Bozeman Trail, see: 
Dorothy M. Johnson, The Bloody Bozeman (New York: McGraw Hill 
Book Co.) 1971. 
90Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 89 . 
91Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
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and the tribesmen, policy makers in Washington D.C. urged 
that the government undertake a plan that would "civilize" 
the Indians. The American nation's notion of "civilizing 
the Indians" had one broad interpretation - the tribesmen 
would be civilized according to western concepts. As early 
as 1854, Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny 
foresaw the detrimental impact that white immigration would 
have on Indian/white relations. With this in mind, 
Manypenny instructed treaty negotiator Isaac Stevens, to 
insist that any treaty negotiated with the Blackfeet reflect 
the government's plan to "Civilize the Indian." The Judith 
River Treaty (1855), which brought the Blackfeet into the 
reservation system, indeed attempted to "gradually reclaim 
the Indians from a nomadic life," and to "encourage them to 
settle in permanent homes and obtain their sustenance by 
agriculture and other pursuits of civilized life."92 
The federal government never promulgated a set formula 
to implement its policy to "civilize" the Indians. Quite 
often the entire process fell under the jurisdiction and 
discretion of the individual Indian agents or a 
"superintendent. "William P. Dole, the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs during Abraham Lincoln's administration, believed 
that confining tribesmen to reservations provided them with 
92Ewers, The Blackfeet, p. 214. 
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their best hope to learn the ways of white civilization. 
Dole wrote: 
...the policy, recently adopted, of confining the 
Indians to reservations, and from time to time as 
they are gradually and become accustomed to the 
idea of individual property, allotting to them 
lands held in severalty, is the best method yet 
devised for their reclamation and advancement in 
civilization.1,93 
Intimidating and difficult as these objectives appeared to 
implement, they provided both the official policy and the 
guidelines employed by the United States Government in its 
dealings with Native American tribesmen. These vague and 
open-ended statements provided the official guidelines to 
the territorial governors serving as ex-officio 
superintendents of Indian affairs. Montana Territory's 
first Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, Sidney Edgerton, confronted the difficult 
task of implementing this policy in Montana Territory. 
On May 26, 1864, Lincoln signed the Enabling Act 
creating Montana Territory. By signing this Enabling Act, 
Lincoln also created the Montana Superintendency to 
administer the Territory's tribesmen. At this time, both 
the Territory and the Superintendency were common federal 
administrative units, designed to exist only until their 
931862 House Executive Document, no.l, 37th Cong., 3rd 
sess., serial 1157 "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 169. 
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varied objectives had been reached. Sidney Edgerton, 
Montana Territory's first governor, assumed the position of 
ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs for the Montana 
Superintendency of Indians when he accepted the appointment 
of Territorial Governor. The record of his administration, 
which extended from June 22, 1864, to July 13, 1866, 94 
amply illustrated the disastrous results of combining these 
two administrative units, with differing objectives, under 
one office. 
Edgerton's career as a territorial politician began on 
March 6, 1863, when Territorial Governor William Wallace of 
Idaho nominated him to the position of Chief Justice of 
Missoula County, Idaho Territory. Shortly after he reached 
his assigned location, the gold mining town of Bannock, 
Idaho Territory, the town's citizens, as well as those of 
nearby Virginia City, collected $2,500 in gold samples and 
enough cash to send Chief Justice Sidney Edgerton to 
Washington, D.C. Edgerton's mission was as a 
representative to plead with Congress for the creation of a 
new territory. The citizens of Bannock and Virginia City 
argued that the territorial capital in Lewiston was 
inaccessible and could not represent their interests. 
Travel and communication between the goldfield communities, 
94Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 101. 
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then part of Idaho Territory, and the Territorial capital at 
Lewiston proved impossible much of the year. Heavy snows in 
the winter blocked the Mullan Road, the only road leading 
from the goldfields to those connections to Lewiston, and 
made the route impassible until well after the spring thaw. 
Citing this inaccessibility and the immediate need for 
government to adjudicate mine claims, these proto-Montanans 
believed that the creation of another territory would make 
their government more accessible and responsive to their 
needs.95 
Justice Edgerton possessed impeccable political 
credentials and proved to be an excellent choice to send to 
Washington D.C. A Radical Republican from Ohio, he had 
represented the Buckeye State for two terms in the United 
States House of Representatives. More important, he had 
befriended both President Abraham Lincoln and fellow Ohioan 
James M. Ashley, the chairmen of the powerful House 
Committee on Territories.96 Immediately upon arriving in 
Washington, he met and reestablished old ties with former 
Idaho Territorial Governor William Wallace who now served as 
95Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 
p. 10. 
96Anne McDonnell, ed., "Edgerton and Lincoln," Montana 
Magazine of History, Vol. 1, No. 4. (October 1951). pp. 43-
44. Edited version of a letter sent from Sidney Edgerton to 
Judge William Hunt, May 23, 1892. 
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the territorial delegate to Congress from Idaho 
Territory.97 
Wasting little time, Edgerton secured a meeting with 
President Lincoln, who fully endorsed the creation of 
another territory in the Northern Rockies. An astute 
politician, Lincoln recognized the creation of another 
western territory as an opportunity to appoint additional 
Republicans to high territorial offices and eventually a new 
Republican State. Edgerton also discovered that 
Representative Ashley had initiated some of the required 
political groundwork by introducing a bill designed to 
provide a temporary government for the Territory of Montana 
on December 14, 18 6 3 . 98 Ashley and other like-minded 
Republicans listened favorably to western citizen's demands 
for the creation of more territories and accompanying 
territorial governments. They argued that although the cost 
of a territorial government was approximately $20,000 a 
year, the protection supplied by tighter governmental 
control over smaller areas would help prevent large scale 
Indian uprisings and result in an actual savings to the 
97William F. Wheeler to Col. Wilbur F. Saunders, August 
22, 1882, File 65, Box 2, Folder 19, (William F. Wheeler 
Collection,) Montana Historical Society, Helena Montana. 
98Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 
p. 11. 
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Federal Government." Through the creation of new 
territories, the Republicans, as long as they retained 
control of the executive branch of government, would enjoy 
the partisan political benefit of appointing Republicans to 
high positions of territorial government. This was 
especially important as the Republican Party represented a 
minority of voters. 
While Edgerton lobbied in Washington, D.C., the Idaho 
Territorial Legislature proposed their own plan to create a 
new territory. Realizing that the current Territory of 
Idaho was too large to manage efficiently and that new 
territories would by necessity have sizeable portions carved 
from it to create new territories, in early 1864, the Idaho 
Territorial Legislature petitioned Congress to create 
"Jefferson Territory" from land already under Idaho's 
jurisdiction. Jefferson Territory, if created, would have 
the Continental Divide and the 113th Meridian as its western 
border, and would place Idaho's eastern border just west of 
the Deer Lodge Valley. This arrangement would conveniently 
eliminate Idaho Territory's problems with the Blackfeet and 
Sioux.100 
"Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 
p. 12. 
100Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 72. 
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Edgerton, however, envisioned Montana's western border 
on the crest of the Bitterroot Mountain Range. The 
Bitterroot boundary would secure the gold fields in Deer 
Lodge County, the Flathead Valley, the Upper Clark Fork 
Valley, and middle Kootenai Valley, all rich in agricultural 
and mining resources, for the new territory. He convinced 
Idaho's Territorial Delegate, William Wallace, that as 
matters now stood, the Idaho Legislature's "Jefferson 
Territory" plan ill-served the settlers east of the 
Bitterroots, as it ignored the problem of accessibility to 
Lewiston. Edgerton's plan, however, insured that the gold 
camps of Alder Gulch, Grasshopper Creek, and Gold Creek 
would have year-round-access to the population centers in 
Bannock and Virginia City.101 
Convinced of the wisdom in Edgerton's plan, William 
Wallace supported his friend, going as far as to endorsing 
the Bitterroot boundary before the hearings conducted by the 
House Committee on Territories. The combined testimony of 
both Edgerton and Wallace swayed the Committee. The House 
Committee approved the Bitterroot boundary, and Congress 
quickly passed it into law.102 
Lincoln signed the Enabling Act into law on May 26, 
101Ibid., p. 71. 
102Ibid., p.11. 
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1864, and created Montana Territory. Idaho Territory 
suffered the loss of a 130 mile strip of territory along 
half of its northern and eastern boundaries. The 
combination of William Wallace's testimony, Sidney 
Edgerton's alliance with James Ashley, and most important, 
Sidney Edgerton's tireless and incessant lobbying, secured 
for Montana Territory some of the region's most economically 
important and grandest terrain. Lincoln rewarded Edgerton 
for his work by appointing him to be Montana Territory's 
first Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs.103 
The creation of Montana Territory also provided 
convenient boundaries for the creation of a new Indian 
superintendency. The Indian Service quickly acted to 
establish the Montana Superintendency of Indian Affairs and 
charged it with administering the nation's relations with 
the tribesmen in Montana Territory. Upon Edgerton's 
appointment as Territorial Governor and ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs on June 22, 1864, the 
Montana Superintendency held responsibility for two 
agencies: the Blackfeet and the Flathead.104 
103For an account of Sidney Edgerton's role in the 
formation of Montana Territory see: Malone and Roeder, 
Montana: A History of Two Centuries, Chapter 5, and Spence, 
Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, Chapter 1. 
104Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, pp. 99-100. 
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Unlike a specific Indian agency, where the agent was 
responsible to tribesmen located at a specified location, an 
Indian superintendency encompassed several agencies within a 
political or geographical tract. The ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs responsibilities lay in 
maintaining relations with and fulfilling United States 
treaty obligations to all tribesmen within the 
superintendency's jurisdiction. In essence, the Indian 
superintendent became another federal official placed 
between the field agent and the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. The agents in charge of agencies reported directly 
to the ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, who then 
reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.105 
The Montana Territorial Governor served as ex-officio 
Superintendent until 1869, when Congress appointed an 
independent federal authority to operate the office. During 
this initial period, Indian agents in the Montana 
Superintendency reported to the Territorial Governor or 
independent superintendent until the superintendency was 
105Here the "chain of command" became muddied. 
Territorial governors were directly responsible to the 
Secretaries of the Interior. As ex-officio superintendents of 
Indian affairs, they were responsible to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, who reported to the Secretary of the Interior. 
There can be little doubt that with this arrangement, many 
territorial governors thought of their role as ex-officio 
superintendents a lesser role than governor. See Neil, "The 
Territorial Governor as Indian Superi ntende nt in the Trans-
Mississippi West," p. 214. 
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discontinued on June 30, 1873. After the office of 
superintendent was abolished, the middle level management 
was eliminated, and agents reported directly to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C.106 
When Congress created the Territory of Montana and the 
Montana Indian Superintendency in 1864, the Indian agencies 
under its jurisdiction consisted of the Blackfeet and the 
Flathead Indian Agencies. Of the two agencies in the 
Montana Indian Superintendency in 1864, the Flathead Agency, 
established in 1854, was the older. The Flathead Agency had 
been initially placed under the Washington Indian 
Superintendency's jurisdiction. Its headquarters was first 
located near the junction of the Flathead and the Jocko 
Rivers. The agency's tribal population was divided between 
the Kootenai and the Pend d'Oreille Tribes, who lived on the 
Jocko Reservation; and the Flathead-Salish, who resided in 
the Bitterroot Valley. In 1857, while the Washington and 
Oregon Superintendencies were temporarily combined under the 
provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1857, Congress 
consolidated the Flathead Agency and renamed it the 
"Washington East of the Cascades Agency."107 
106Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 99. 
107U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 11, (December 3, 1855 — 
March 3, 1859) "An act making appropriation for the Current 
and Contingent Expenses of the Indian Department for 
fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with various Indian tribes, for 
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In 1861, the Flathead Agency was reestablished and 
transferred from the Washington to the Idaho Superintendency 
in 1863. With the creation of Montana Territory, Congress 
transferred the agency to the Montana Superintendency in 
1864. From September 1865 until February 1866, Congress re­
assigned the Agency to the Idaho Superintendency "...for 
greater facility of communication."108 Sidney Edgerton 
realized the communication problems this would create, and 
while in Washington D. C. he wrote: 
While I am not particularly desirous to have 
charge of the Flathead Agency, at the same time I 
trust you will allow me to submit that the 
distance from Flathead Agency to Boise City, the 
Capitol of Idaho, where the Governor resides, is 
about 400 miles farther then to my residence. 
Furthermore, during the winter months, all 
communications from the Agency have to be sent via 
Virginia City to Boise City, inasmuch as the 
Bitterroot Mountains are situated between and on 
the direct route from Flat Head Agency to Boise 
City.109 
Congress reversed itself in 1866, by returning the Flathead 
Agency to the Montana Indian Superintendency's 
the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and fifty-
eight, " 3 March 1857. 
108 1 8 6 5 House Executive Document no. 1, 39th Cong., 1st 
sess., serial 1248, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p.200. 
109Governor Sidney S. Edgerton to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs D.N. Cooley, January 24, 1866, Letters Received, 
Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, Roll 488, 
Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
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jurisdiction.110 
The second agency in the Montana Superintendency 
consisted of the Blackfeet Agency. The signing of the Judith 
River Treaty in 1855 established the reservation and 
situated the headquarters of the Blackfeet Agency at Fort 
Benton. Although federal law outlawed the practice of 
trading whiskey to the Indians, this practice remained 
common at the fort. Due to Fort Benton's isolated location, 
the law was not enforced. Compounding the lack of a law 
enforcement agency was the fact that very few Fort 
Bentonites sought to have the law enforced. Most were 
illegal whiskey traders, and huge profits were gained 
through this illegal activity. 
From 1855, until the creation of the Montana 
Superintendency, the Blackfeet Agency, comprised of the 
Blackfeet, Piegan, Blood, and Gros Ventre Tribes, came under 
the jurisdictions of the Central, Dakota, and Idaho 
Superintendencies. The Blackfeet Agency's headquarters 
remained at Fort Benton until 1869, when the facility was 
moved to a site on the Teton River approximately 75 miles 
northwest from Fort Benton.111 The Blackfeet Agency, while 
110Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 100. 
1111869 House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Cong., 2nd 
sess., serial 1414. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Blackfoot Agency Report" p. 742. 
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located at Fort Benton, created the most trouble for 
Montana's Territorial Governors as ex-officio 
Superintendents of Indian Affairs.112 
Fort Benton was a wide open town with a history of 
lawlessness. Established in 1846, it holds a strong claim 
to be the oldest continually inhabited town in Montana.113 
Fort Benton, often referred to as the "World's Innermost 
Port", lay at the western most point of the Missouri River 
navigable by commercial river traffic.114 In 1864, Fort 
Benton, located in the heart of Blackfeet country, was 
surrounded by a number of past and present Blackfeet trading 
posts. These posts included Fort Piegan, 1831-32; Fort 
McKenzie, 1832-44; Fort Cotton, 1844-45; Fort Lewis, 1845-
47; Fort Campbell, 184 6-47; Fort Campbell II, 1847-5 9; Fort 
Labarge 1862-66; and Fort Francis A. Chardon, 1844-46.115 
Fort Benton's economic importance grew with the beginning of 
the buffalo robe trade. Buffalo robes, far too heavy to be 
112For a detailed discussion of the problems at Fort 
Benton, which include racial tensions and whiskey trading, see 
Ewers, The Blackfeet, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1958) Chapter 14. 
113Joel Overholser, Fort Benton: World's Innermost Port 
(Fort Benton, MT: Joel Overholser, 1987), p. 19. 
114From St. Louis, Missouri, it is 2, 385 miles on the 
Missouri River to Fort Benton, and a further 1,100 miles to 
salt water. See Overholser, Fort Benton, p. v. 
ll3Ibid., p . 30 . 
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economically freighted overland from the frontier, could be 
profitably shipped by steamboat down the Missouri River from 
Fort Benton to the commercial trade center at St. Louis, 
Missouri.116 
The Federal Government did not possess the economic and 
military resources to exercise its authority in Eastern 
Montana Territory, and the tribes inhabiting this area, the 
Western Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Crow, lived outside of 
the reservation system. Eastern Montana was sparsely 
populated and the territorial tribesmen who inhabited this 
region continued their traditional hunter/gatherer lifestyle 
with little interference from the American Government.117 
When Sidney Edgerton was appointed Territorial Governor 
of Montana and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
for Montana Territory, he held the task of moving the 
Territory towards statehood while directing the tribal 
populations towards civilization. Edgerton and his 
successors learned that being in charge of these delicate 
and opposing tasks could become an administrative nightmare 
especially when opposing obligations could not be carried 
116Ibid., p. 35. 
117By 1867, through a series of military battles and 
sieges, Chief Red Cloud and his Sioux warriors forced the 
United States to abandon its series of Forts built along the 
Bozeman Trail. For an history of the Bozeman Trail, see 
Johnson, The Bloody Bozeman. 
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out. The agents, already in place at the Flathead and 
Blackfeet Agencies, now reported to Edgerton as ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Despite the assistance of 
two experienced Indian agents, he inherited the problems 
with the Blackfeet, and maintaining relations with the 
Blackfeet became the new Territorial Governor's major tribal 
concern.118 
Fort Benton's proximity to the new Territory's western 
settlements fostered tensions which often erupted into 
violence between the Blackfeet and the whites. Edgerton's 
immediate problems were two-fold. The first focused upon 
the very location of the Blackfeet Agency at Fort Benton, 
which was far from any civil authority. Law and order ended 
hundreds of miles from Fort Benton. The second problem 
concerned the enforcement of past treaty obligations the 
United States had made with the tribesmen especially the 
timely distribution of the Indian's annuities.119 
Edgerton faced long term problems with the Blackfeet 
that he could not solve. The issue of white encroachment on 
Blackfeet Tribal lands required the territorial governor/ex-
118For a discussion of the Blackfeet in Montana Territory 
during the Civil War, see Edmund Jefferson Danzinger, Jr., 
Indians and Bureaucrats: Administrating the Reservation Policy 
During the Civil War, Chapter 11 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1974) . 
119Ibid., p. 68. 
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officio superintendent's attention, however, given his lack 
of an efficient police force, there remained little Edgerton 
could do to evict these white trespassers. Even if he had 
such a force at his command, political disaster would befall 
any governor who turned soldiers against citizens. On the 
other hand, Edgerton's position as Territorial Governor 
mandated he encourage and protect immigration and that he 
act to hasten the transformation of Montana Territory to 
Montana State. The use of force might expedite that 
transformation, but excessive force might inflame popular 
opinion in the East, thus jeopardizing his position as 
territorial governor. 
Compounding the problem, the United States Congress 
appropriated territorial funds slowly. This lethargic 
fiscal action forced agents to deliver the treaty annuities 
promised to the Indians sporadically, at best; and the 
Indians, resentful of this inexcusable delay, grew angry. 
Contact with whites brought diseases. Not understanding 
communicable diseases, and witnessing the decimation of 
their families and tribal members, the leaders of the 
Blackfeet Confederacy accused whites of spreading poison 
through these annuities.120 Finally, ruthless, 
irresponsible traders, who provided whiskey to tribesmen and 
120Ibid., p.51. 
77 
therefore won the friendship of the Indians. The stature of 
those traders with the tribesmen grew as white encroachment 
on Indian lands increased, which threatened the traders and 
tribesmen. This process furthered the region's instability. 
White immigration into the Bitterroot Valley forced even the 
peaceful Salish Indians who lived there to display an ever 
increasingly hostile attitude towards the whites.121 
Montana territorial citizens compounded the tribal 
problems by criticizing Congress's relations with tribes. 
Congress' actions disgusted frontier settlers who believed 
the Eastern Congressmen were too far removed from the scene 
to understand either Indians or the proper way to deal with 
them. Westerners expressed opinions implying that 
Easterners mollycoddled the tribesmen. They believed that 
the best method of handling Indian affairs was with lead 
fired from a rifle.122 
Hostilities between tribes and whites often helped to 
boost the western economy. Equipping an American military 
force was quite expensive. Most of the gear would be 
purchased from local dealers at inflated prices, and the 
bill for these expenditures would be sent back to Washington 
121Robert G. Athearn, "Early Territorial Montana: A 
Problem in Colonial Administration," Montana Magazine of 
History, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 15. 
122Robert G. Athearn, "Frontier Critics of the Western 
Army," Montana Magazine of History, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.15. 
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D.C. for reimbursement. Westerners also wanted the 
government to provide permanent military bases in their 
territories, and, most significantly, they demanded a 
reduction of Indian lands and the opening up of these 
"freed" lands to settlement. Herein lay the main 
contradiction faced by Edgerton and the other western 
territorial governors: it was impossible to please his 
white constituents to move the Territory towards settlement 
and statehood while at the same time effectively discharging 
his duties as the federal representative and guarantor of 
Indian rights and property. 
As Montana's first Territorial Governor, Sidney 
Edgerton undertook those first steps, as described under the 
organic act, to start the wheels of territorial government 
into motion. Arriving in Bannock from Washington, D.C. in 
July, 1864, he busied himself with the formation of judicial 
districts, commissioned county officers, named Bannock as 
the temporary Territorial Capital and ordered a census 
taken.123 
Edgerton had functioned brilliantly as the elegant 
spokesman who pleaded for creating Montana Territory. He 
possessed the ability to immerse himself into and follow 
through to successful completion one straightforward task at 
123Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 
p. 20. 
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one time. On the other hand, Edgerton compromised only 
reluctantly, and this hurt him in the unforgiving world of 
Montana Territorial politics, an arena where give and take 
was essential. A Radical Republican and abolitionist, the 
Ohioan had little in common with the Democratic majority of 
in Montana Territory, many of whom expressed Southern 
sympathies. 
Reluctant to operate outside the boundaries of partisan 
politics, Edgerton could not hide his contempt toward the 
Democrats. In his opening speech to the first Territorial 
Legislature, Edgerton called former Democratic President 
James Buchanan an "imbecile" in referring to his mishandling 
of the events that led the nation towards the Civil War.124 
Afraid of Southern sympathizers in Montana's Territorial 
Government, he insisted that all the legislators take the 
"Iron Clad Oath". This oath bound its taker to swear that 
he had never taken up arms against the United States, and 
was intended by Congress to insure the loyalty of all newly 
installed officials in the reconstructed South. The 
Democrats and Edgerton agreed on the necessity for laws 
concerning road construction and maintenance, founding 
124Sidney S. Edgerton, "Governor Edgerton's First 
Message", Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana. 
Vol. Ill, 1900. p.347. 
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public schools, and those involving irrigation and 
mining.125 
The Governor's uncompromising, idealistic nature also 
adversely affected tribal relations. Indeed, his stated 
Indian policy was confusing and worked toward cross means. 
It also typified politicians of that era, particularly those 
who held the position of territorial governor/ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs. In his first message to 
the Territorial Assembly, Edgerton promised to punish 
promptly and severely any Indian aggression, however he also 
warned that whites would be punished if they infringed on 
Indian rights. He summed up his statements on Indian policy 
with: 
I trust that the Government will, at an early day, 
take steps for the extinguishment of the Indian 
title in this territory, in order that our lands 
may be brought into market.126 
How could one man work to extinguish the Indian's title to 
their lands, and at the same time act as a guardian of their 
interests and maintain peace? The difficult, if not 
impossible, task was made still more challenging by the 
partisan politics of the era. Edgerton's final remark 
125Malone and Roeder, Montana: a History of Two Centuries, 
pp. 76-77. 
126Edgerton, "Governor Edgerton's First Message", as cited 
in Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. 
Ill, 1900. p.344. 
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concerning his Indian policy illustrates the contradictions 
and unworkable goals inherent in the combined office of 
territorial governor/ex-officio superintendent of Indian 
Affairs. 
Despite the severity of the Indian troubles facing 
Montana Territory and his administration, Edgerton simply 
neglected his role as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs. He complained to Secretary of State Seward that: 
...the duties devolved upon me by virtue of my 
office, as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, were 
not defined by any instructions from the 
Department, and the subordinate agencies were 
securing supplies from other channels than through 
me. The Indians within my Superintendency, with 
an unimportant exception, held the title to the 
mineral and agricultural portions of the 
Territory, which were settled; some of them were 
intensely hostile, and not a soldier was in the 
Territory, nor had any force been ordered there, 
so far as I could learn, to protect the rapidly 
increasing and important interest there 
existing.127 
Upset with the lack of funds and staff personnel 
received from Washington, Edgerton was overburdened with the 
multitude of duties required to organize Montana's 
Territorial Government. In a letter of April 4, 1866, 
Edgerton claimed he was overworked and complained to 
Secretary of the Interior James Harlan of not having a 
127Secretary of the Interior Jason Harlan to Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs D.N. Cooley, April 4, 1866, Letters 
Received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, 
Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
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Territorial Secretary, of the necessity of employing a clerk 
for his superintendency of Indian affairs, and of being 
compelled to pay this clerk from his own funds. He was 
saddled with the burdens of his job and the added duties of 
the Secretary that devolved upon him. 
Edgerton justified employing a clerk by citing examples 
of his many tasks including presiding over the legislative 
session being held as well as the "...difficulties with the 
Blackfeet ..., which rendered the services of a clerk 
absolutely necessary."128 One cannot blame him for being 
upset with his thankless job, as only a territorial 
secretary could release funds and Edgerton operated as a 
territorial governor for one year without one.129 
Additionally, Edgerton bore the added expense of paying for 
many of Montana's expenses from his personal funds.130 
Discouraged, uncompromising, and unpaid, Edgerton 
neglected the work associated with the Superintendent of 
128Governor Sidney S. Edgerton to Secretary of the 
Interior James Harlan, March 31, 1866, Letters Received, 
Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, Roll 488, 
Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
129Lincoln nominated two men to the position of Montana's 
Territorial Secretary, both of whom refused the position. See 
James McClellan Hamilton, From Wilderness to Statehood, p.282. 
Lincoln's murder in April 1865, delayed the issue and his 
successor, Andrew Johnson, a Union Democrat, was determined 
that a Radical Republican would not be appointed. 
130Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 77. 
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Indian affairs duties; work crucial to his political success 
in Montana Territory. The frustrations of the two jobs 
created a contempt for the position of superintendent of 
Indian affairs. Sidney Edgerton failed to submit one of the 
required annual reports to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs during his tenure as Montana's ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs. His actions seemed to 
validate the indictment levied by the Doolittle Commission 
against the unworkable practice of employing territorial 
governors as superintendents of Indian affairs and 
highlighted the need to separate these two offices. The 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs, from 1864 through 1866, 
complained in their annual reports of a lack of reports 
submitted from the Montana Superintendency. In 18 64, 
Commissioner William P. Dole wrote, "No reports from the 
Governors, who are ex-officio Superintendents of Indian 
Affairs for these (Idaho and Montana) Territories, have yet 
been received.1,131 
The following year, Dole further vented his frustration 
towards his office and the ineffectiveness of Congress's 
Indian administration when he complained: 
First among these is the neglect of many of the 
officers responsible to this office to forward 
1311864 House Executive Document no.l, 38th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1220. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p.172 
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their monthly, quarterly, and annual reports at 
the proper time, in disregard of repeated 
directions from the office.132 
He added, "...I do not know of any way to remedy this 
difficulty except by reporting to the department each case 
of delinquency, and relying upon it to seek a remedy by a 
change of officers."133 Dole singled out individuals by 
name, and he included Sidney Edgerton in his remarks 
describing Montana conditions: "...we have no report, either 
this year or last, from Governor Edgerton, ex-officio 
superintendent.1,134 
In 1866, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Lewis Vital 
Bogy, reported that: 
No annual report from this superintendent has been 
received. The governor, and ex-officio 
superintendent, Ho. Sidney Edgerton, has been 
absent from the Territory a considerable portion 
of the time, and the general interests of the 
service have been in the hands of General Meagher, 
secretary and acting governor, who, at last 
accounts was about to leave the capital of the 
Territory to visit the Flathead agency.135 
Governor Edgerton handled Indian Affairs in a 
132 1 8 6 5 House Executive Document no. 1, 39th Cong., 1st 
sess., serial 1248, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 121. 
133Ibid., p. 121. 
134Ibid., p. 199. 
1351866 House Executive Documents no. 1, 39th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1284, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 40. 
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consistent manner. He simply did as little as possible. 
His uncompromising rigidity ill-served him, his nation, and 
his constituents, while he achieved little toward 
safeguarding the rights of Indians under his authority. 
Governor Edgerton, who, assumed the duties of the 
Territorial Governor for Montana Territory but could not 
disperse money without a territorial secretary, eagerly 
awaited the arrival of newly appointed Territorial 
Secretary, Thomas Francis Meagher.136 
On August 4, 1865, President Andrew Johnson appointed 
Thomas Francis Meagher, a northern Democrat and a minor 
Union Civil War General, to Montana's Territorial 
Secretaryship. A dynamic personality, Meagher had been 
involved in the revolutionary Young Ireland movement. 
Captured by the British and sentenced to be drawn and 
quartered for treason in 1848, he cheated his fate when the 
sentence was later commuted to banishment in Tasmania. In 
1852, he escaped from Tasmania and came to New York where he 
became the editor of the Irish News. During the American 
Civil War he commanded the famous New York Irish Brigade and 
led his unit into numerous encounters against Confederate 
forces. Reaching the rank of brigadier general, Meagher 
136James L. Thane, ed., A Governor's Wife on the Mining 
Frontier: The Letters of Mary Edgerton from Montana, 1863-1865 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Library, Tanner Trust 
Fund, 1976) p. 60. 
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felt constrained by the War Department's lack of support for 
the Irish Brigade's recruiting efforts after its ranks had 
been depleted after heavy fighting. Citing the War 
Department's unwillingness to grant him leave to recruit 
more volunteers into the Irish Brigade's depleted ranks and 
the need to recuperate from a wound he received, Meagher 
tendered his military resignation to Lincoln's Secretary of 
War Edwin M. Staunton on May 8, 1863, who accepted it a week 
later, on May 14th.137 
On July 27, 1865, he received President Andrew 
Johnson's telegram appointing him to a four-year term as 
Territorial Secretary of Montana. His duties included 
recording all legal proceedings in the territorial 
legislature, and, more significantly, 
...in case of the death, removal, 
resignation, or absence of the governor 
from the territory, the secretary shall 
be, and he is hereby, authorized and 
required to execute and perform all the 
powers and duties of the governor during 
such vacancy or absence..."138 
Meagher telegraphed his acceptance two days after 
receiving his appointment and began his journey west. 
Departing in early August 1865, Meagher reached Bannock the 
137Robert G. Athearn, Thomas Francis Meagher: An Irish 
Revolutionary in America (New York: Arno Press, 1976) p. 125. 
138 138U. S., Statutes at Large, Vol 13, (December 1863 
— December 1865) "An Act to provide a temporary government 
for the Territory of Montana," 26 May 1864. 
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following September. Traveling to Bannock, Montana 
Territory's capital in 1865, was a grueling journey that 
involved a great deal of time and inflicted much discomfort 
on even the hardiest of travelers.139 
Upon his arrival, Edgerton ascertained that Territorial 
Secretary Meager was not bonded, and therefore could not 
disburse territorial funds.140 This, in turn, meant that 
treaty annuities could neither be bought nor dispersed to 
the Indians. Governor Edgerton quickly introduced Meagher 
to the local citizens and briefed him on the state of 
affairs in the Territory. Edgerton then left for 
Washington, without securing official leave, ostensively to 
alert those in the federal government of the money problems 
confronting Montana Territory. His departure placed the job 
of acting governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs in Montana Territory on Meagher's shoulders.141 
When Meagher assumed the Territorial Governorship of 
Montana, both political parties viewed him as a potential 
political ally. A Union Democrat, the Democrats welcomed 
him as one of their own, while his war record endeared him 
139Athearn, Thomas Francis Meagher, p. 14 6. 
140Thane, ed., A Governor's Wife on the Mining Frontier, 
p. 60. 
141Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 
p. 34 . 
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to the Republicans. Meagher believed that the Democratic 
Party in the Territory were riddled with untrustworthy 
Confederate sympathizers and aligned himself with the 
Territory's Republicans. Within a few weeks, Meagher, 
always a political opportunist, reversed his political 
loyalties and joined with the Democrats, the majority Party 
and the one which largely comprised the Territory's Irish 
citizens.142 Both Meagher and the Territory's Democrats 
wanted statehood for Montana. Meagher's political ambitions 
led him to set his sights on becoming the State's Senator. 
Montana statehood did not sit well with the country's 
Republicans because they feared another Democratic state in 
the Union.143 
During Meagher's custodianship, confusion reigned in 
the halls of Montana's Territorial Government as the Radical 
Republican Congressmen in Washington, D.C. declared both of 
the Legislatures called by Meagher "null and void." Montana 
Republicans started a campaign of slander and libel against 
Meagher depicting him as a hopeless drunk and related ribald 
// 
stories of his boasting about the numerous conquests he made 
142Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 78. 
143Ibid., p. 80. 
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in the executive mansion with ladies of ill-repute.144 
The legacy of Edgerton's lackluster stewardship of the 
Montana Superintendency left Meagher embroiled in partisan 
politics. This state of affairs, however, did not deter 
Meagher from striving for the potential political gain and 
the opportunity to recover his past glories that might be 
garnered from successfully campaigning in an Indian war. 
On October 20, 1865, Meagher requested that Major 
General Frank Wheaton, Commander of Montana's military 
district, place five hundred cavalry under Meagher's command 
to combat both the problem of Indian hostilities as well as 
to suppress an estimated 300 road agents.145 His 
proclivity towards military action further manifested itself 
in a letter to Secretary of State William Seward on December 
11, 1865, in which he urged that a cavalry force of at least 
1,000 was needed in Montana to quell the Sioux along the 
Powder River, and that this force took precedence over the 
need of a legislature.146 
On December 14, 1865, Meagher reiterated these 
sentiments when he wrote to Indian Commissioner Cooley that 
he expected little trouble from the tribes in his Territory 
144Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 
p. 39. 
145Athearn, Thomas Francis Meagher, pp. 147-48. 
146Athearn, Thomas Francis Meagher, p. 14 8. 
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with the exception of the Sioux. The Oglala Sioux, under 
the leadership of Red Cloud, had started their military-
campaigns against white encroachment on their hunting 
grounds along the Bozemen Trail. Meagher wrote: 
As for the Sioux, and their allies and 
accomplices, it is my clear and positive 
conviction that they will never be 
reduced to friendly and reliable 
relations with the whites but by the 
strong and crushing hand of the military 
power of the nation. 
I have, in my communication with 
the Secretary of State, taken the 
liberty of expressing this conviction, 
and on the strength of it have requested 
him to obtain from the War Department a 
competent cavalry force for this 
Territory. I trust that you will see 
fit to approve of this application which 
I have urged in my two-fold capacity as 
acting governor and superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, and that in the proper 
quarter you will give it your ernest 
support.147 
Meagher was quick to draw sabers against those tribes 
like the Sioux whom he felt could not be made to follow the 
-'white man's ways. He also pleaded eloquently for those 
tribes he believed were worthy of "civilizing" and whom the 
government had neglected. A case can be made that Meagher 
was not someone who "..longed more for glory than for 
1471866 House Executive Document no 1, 39th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1284 "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 197. 
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Indians."148 Indeed, in many instances his actions served 
as a precursor to Grant's Peace Policy. Territorial 
Governor Meagher, in numerous instances, acted as a man of 
vision in foreseeing needed Indian policy reforms in Montana 
Territory. 
Meagher wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
Dennis N. Cooley, urging humanitarian action in behalf of 
the Territory's non-reservation Shoshoni and Bannock 
Indians. Meagher ordered a Montana political office seeker, 
Nathaniel Hall, to investigate their plight. Hall suggested 
building an agency to protect them from their pony stealing 
Indian neighbors. Hall concluded his report with: 
The most influential of them feel that the Great 
Spirit has so ordered that they must give way to 
the palefaces and that the only safety is in 
throwing themselves into the hands of the Great 
Chief at Washington asking that he will throw his 
big robe of protection over them untill fsicl they 
fulfill the destination for which they were 
created.149 
Meagher agreed wholeheartedly with Hall and forwarded 
his finding with the following to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs: 
148Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land, between PP. 126 and 
127, caption with pictures of Major General George Armstrong 
Custer and General Thomas Francis Meagher, "Two Headstrong 
Generals. " 
149Nathaniel Hall to Governor Thomas Francis Meagher, 
April 6, 1866, Letters Received, Office of Indian Affairs, 
Montana Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
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At the moment I write, there are eleven lodges 
belonging to them standing close to town 
(Bannock), and they contain as much misery and 
filth and dire want as might be exceeded only by 
the huts of the Terra del Fuegans. 
He urged the Commissioner that these "poor creatures" be 
formed into an agency. "Unrecognized, unprotected, and 
outlawed, as it were, as they are now, they are indeed a 
revolting reproach to our civilization." Of course, he 
nominated Hall to head this proposed Agency.150 
In the same letter, he reported Blackfeet depredations 
in a more familiar vein: 
There is, however, no hope whatever to 
be entertained that such outrages will 
cease until the presence of a military 
force in the Territory, judiciously 
distributed and posted, shall , by 
intimidation, coerce these intractable 
savages to do what no treaty, however 
liberal, and no amount of annuities 
will, in my opinion, induce them to 
do.151 
Meagher astutely perceived that one man could not give 
the attention required of Governor and Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs in Montana because the agencies were 
separated from between two and three hundred miles. In a 
wise move, he nominated Flathead Agent Gad Upson for the 
position of full-time Superintendent in Montana because of 
1501866 House Executive Document no.l, 39th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1284. p. 199. 
151Ibid., p. 199. 
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his wealth of experience in Indian matters. To defuse 
hostilities between the whites and the tribesmen, Meagher 
proposed that a commission be appointed which would 
investigate and adjudicate claims by awarding compensation 
to those parties suffering loss from Indian attacks.152 
The Federal Government ignored an opportunity to allay 
tensions between the two peoples, when they refused to 
ratify a treaty negotiated by Blackfeet Agent Gad Upson and 
acting Governor Thomas Francis Meagher with the Blackfeet 
and Gros Ventre Tribes at Fort Benton on November 16, 1865. 
Under the terms of the treaty, the Blackfeet agreed to cede 
the lands south of the Missouri River and withdraw 
northward, away from white settlements, in return for 
annuities.153 
Congress never ratified the "Upson" Treaty. Almost 
immediately after its singing, Blackfeet braves stole horses 
from the whites, an act which the tribesmen considered 
heroic. Compounding this crime, Piegan and Blood war parties 
killed a number of miners and traders within two months of 
152Thomas Francis Meagher to William Seward, Dec 14, 1865, 
Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana 
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
153A copy of this treaty can be read in Treaties and 
Agreements of the Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest, ed. 
by Vine Deloria and Kirke Kickingbird, 1973 Vol. 3, by the 
Institute for the Development of Indian Lav,7, Washington, D.C., 
1973. 
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the council meeting.154 When information of these events 
reached Secretary of the State William Seward, he became 
convinced that neither side would abide by the treaty's 
terms. Although the "Upson" Treaty held the promise of 
peace between the two peoples, Seward did not submit it to 
the Senate for ratification.155 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dennis Cooley supported 
the Secretary of State's decision in this matter. Cooley 
spoke out against the treaty because he had information that 
the tribesmen had "...almost immediately broken out into 
hostility, and thus violated their treaty stipulations."156 
Although Congress did not ratify the treaty, officials in 
the Indian Service acted as if it had been ratified and held 
the tribes accountable to its terms. 
When Agent Upson died suddenly in San Francisco enroute 
to Washington to deliver the Blackfeet Treaty that he and 
Meagher had negotiated and singed on November 16, 18 65, 
Meagher wrote President Andrew Johnson and urged him to make 
the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Montana a full-time 
position, and to separate the office from that of the 
154Ewers, The Blackfeet, p. 240. 
155Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 90. 
1561866 House Executive Documents no. 1, 39th Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1284, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs" p. 13. 
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governor's. Meagher suggested himself for the position, 
noting that it would be "far more in consonance with my 
predilections than either the Secretaryship or 
Governorship.11157 
Meagher, known as the "acting one", was relieved of his 
role as acting governor with the arrival of Territorial 
Governor Green Clay Smith in October 1866. At the urging of 
the legislature, on January 3, 1867, Governor Smith, with 
less than three months in office, returned to Washington to 
persuade Congress of Montana's need for more military 
protection. In his absence, Meagher once again resumed his 
duties as acting governor and ex-officio Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, and once again chaos returned.158 
Sidney Edgerton's tenure from 1864 -1866 as Montana's 
Territorial Governor/ex-officio Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs can only be described as a failure. The reasons for 
his failure were recognized by many leaders, but Congress 
failed to rectify the problems. Like so many of the 
politicians appointed to territorial office, Edgerton viewed 
his position as temporary in nature and as a stepping stone 
to further his career. Even had that not been the case, 
Congress never gave Edgerton the wherewithal properly to 
157Athearn, Thomas Francis Meagher, pp. 154-155. 
158Malone and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries, 
p. 80. 
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execute his duties. When Secretary Meagher came to Montana, 
Edgerton gave him the briefest of briefings and left the 
Territory as quickly as possible. He turned the reigns of 
government over to a man who, although capable of 
recognizing problems with the administration of Indian 
Affairs, was also ill-suited to hold the position. 
It would be unjustifiable to hold one man accountable 
for this tragedy. The system that evolved through practice 
and legislation proved inadequate. The government's policy 
was to assimilate the Indian peacefully, and instead, it 
produced hostility and open warfare. If anything, relations 
with the Indians grew worse. The office of ex-officio 
superintendent failed to achieve its objectives. Edgerton, 
and especially his successor Meagher, recognized and 
suggested constructive means to improve the Territory's 
Indian Administration. In the absence of constructive 
reform, however, one man, Edgerton, neglected his office and 
the other, Meagher, abused it. 
CHAPTER IV 
GOVERNORS SMITH AND ASHLEY: 18 66-18 68 
Montana Territory had an easy birth, but a difficult 
infancy. The problems that frustrated Edgerton and Meagher 
continued to plague their successors. Factionalism plagued 
the Territory's politics. The predominately Democratic 
population resented the appointed Radical Republican 
governor Edgerton, who, overwhelmed by the office, ignored 
Indian affairs and had so stubbornly clung to his 
uncompromising political principals that he completely 
alienated the majority of his constituents. After briefing 
his newly arrived Territorial Secretary, Thomas Francis 
Meagher, for one week, Edgerton left Montana Territory to 
lobby on behalf of the Territory's interests in Washington 
D.C. Meagher, an opportunistic man of fickle political 
loyalties, took over the office in Edgerton's absence. His 
claim to the gubernatorial office was held up to such public 
ridicule that he was saddled with the derogatory appellation 
of the "Acting One." 
Sidney Egerton's approach to Indian affairs in the 
fledgling Territory consisted primarily of ignoring them as 
much as was possible. His successor, Meagher, expressed 
some interest in Indian affairs and recommended that 
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Congress create an independent Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs for Montana Territory. Meagher then put himself 
forward for the post. His designs upon the independent 
Superintendency should be attributed to his propensity for 
self-aggrandizement rather than to any great benevolent 
concern for the Territory's tribesmen. However, Meagher's 
suggestion was a step in the right direction. 
This undistinguished background set the stage for 
Montana's last two territorial governors/ex-officio 
superintendents of Indian affairs. The first of these was 
Green Clay Smith from Kentucky. Born on July 2, 1832 in 
Richmond Kentucky, Smith graduated from Transylvania 
University's law school, Lexington, Kentucky in 1850. 
While serving in the Kentucky legislature in 1860, he 
took a strong stand against secession. To underscore his 
commitment to the Union, he resigned his seat and enlisted 
in the Union Army in 1861 as a private. Smith's promotions 
came rapidly. By the early part of 1862, he had attained 
the rank of colonel, and by June of the same year he was 
commissioned a brigadier general. In 1863, he resigned his 
commission in order to serve as Representative from Kentucky 
in the 38th and 39th Congress. A popular congressman with 
an outstanding military record, Smith nearly became 
Lincoln's running mate in the 1864 election, but lost the 
nomination to Andrew Johnson, a Unionist Democrat from 
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Tennessee. Towards the end of the Civil War, in March 1865, 
Smith was brevetted Major General of the Volunteers for 
gallantry in the field.159 
Johnson appointed Smith as the Governor of Montana 
Territory on July 13, 1866. Smith accepted the position, 
and arrived in the Territorial Capital on October 3rd of 
that year.160 
Smith fit the mold of many territorial governors, at 
least as he fulfilled his duties as Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs. Indeed, he could be compared with Washington's 
Isaac Stevens. A popular Territorial Governor, as well as 
moral, sober, and a capable man of considerable talent and 
energy, Smith's record as ex-officio superintendent of 
Indian affairs, like Steven's, remained poor. In his first 
address to the Territorial Legislature, delivered on 
November 6, 1866, the Governor announced a hard line policy 
against those Indians he deemed hostile. Smith, like 
Meagher before him, directly expressed his dislike of the 
Sioux, who "...had scarcely made a treaty with the 
government, than they leaped upon the warpath, and in 
conjunction with other tribes with whom we had a right to 
159McMullin and Walker, Biographical Directory of American 
Territorial Governors, p.212. 
160James E. Calloway, "Governor Green Clay Smith, 1866-
18 68," Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, 
Vol. 5, 1904, p.113. 
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expect peace, murdered and plundered our people."161 
He continued: 
If the Government will help us, we will be glad, 
and heartily co-operate; but if not, we must take 
the matter in our own hands, and teach the red man 
that he cannot with impunity kill and rob. We 
will be just and fair to them, but they must 
respect our rights.162 
One element of that "right" which Smith referred to was the 
perceived need of the whites for "...all the agricultural 
land for cultivation."163 
In general, Smith paid scant attention to Indian 
affairs. His hard line position remained unchanged. In his 
second address to the Montana Territorial Legislature he 
lamented the conduct of some of the militia. When General 
Alfred Terry, under pressure from the Federal Government, 
mustered out the Montana Territorial Militia, many enlistees 
and officers stole government animals and equipment. Smith, 
however, still expressed "a debt of gratitude" for those who 
served faithfully and well. He went on to expand upon his 
belief in the importance of an efficient militia to defend 
the country against "...marauding and desperate bands of 
161Green Clay Smith, "Governor Green Clay Smith's 
Message," Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, 
Vol. 5, 1904, p. 137. 
162Ibid., pp. 137-38. 
163Ibid., p. 137. 
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Indians."164 This statement constituted his sole reference 
to Indian policy or problems in Montana Territory.165 
Montana's politics remained rife with bitter 
factionalism stemming from the problems created by 
Republican appointed judges and elected legislatures 
controlled by the Democrats. In this political morass. 
Governor Smith applied for an official leave of absence and 
spent the first half of 1867 in Washington lobbying for 
Montana's interests. Smith's departure meant that the reins 
of the Montana Territory's Government once again lay in the 
hands of a territorial secretary, acting as governor and ex-
of f icio superintendent. Thomas Francis Meagher, a man who 
had already proven himself both ambitious and unable to 
bridge the Territory's partisan politics, again found 
himself in the governor's office.166 
Meagher's first tenure as acting governor in 1866 had 
failed to provide him an opportunity either to secure a 
permanent political position or to win the glory needed to 
164Green Clay Smith "Second Message of Governor Green Clay 
Smith" Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, 
Vol. 5, 1904, pp. 142. 
165 See Green Clay Smith, "Second Message of Governor 
Green Clay Smith" and "Message Delivered by Green Clay Smith, 
Governor of Montana, to the Extra Session, Dec. 14, 1867," 
Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. 5, 
1904, pp. 140-177. 
166Athearn, "Early Territorial Montana," p. 17. 
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propel him into the spotlight of national prominence. 
Meagher was a different man from the year before. 
Frustrated that his career had reached a dead end, he had 
wanted to resign the Territorial Secretaryship when Governor 
Smith arrived, but Smith talked him into staying in the 
office. On April 16 1867, when Meagher was acting governor, 
the murder of John Bozemen and the wounding of Thomas Cover 
in an attack by Blackfeet Indians in the Gallitin Valley, 
provided Meagher with what he must have considered was his 
last opportunity to save himself from obscurity.167 Gone 
was Meagher the statesman of 18 66 who had advocated viable 
changes in the administration of Indian policy. In his 
stead emerged "Commander" Meagher, determined to secure fame 
as an Indian fighter. 
Meagher's Civil War experience demonstrated to him that 
waging an aggressive war and fighting it to a successful 
conclusion could provide the fame necessary to secure a 
political appointment. Meagher decided to portray Bozemen's 
murder at the hands of five Blackfeet warriors as a major 
Indian uprising that he, as Commander in Chief of the 
Montana Territorial militia, would quell.168 
On April 24, "Commander" Meagher held a war meeting and 
167M.A. Leeson, History of Montana: 1739 - 1885, (Chicago: 
Warner, Beers & Co., 1885), p. 119. 
168Athearn, "Early Territorial Montana," p. 17. 
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rally in Helena. Generally, the settlers in the Territory 
thought the tribesmen should be punished. Montana's 
experience in Indian warfare up to that time had been a 
series of depredations, involving horse and cattle theft, as 
well as isolated killings. Meagher played on their demands 
for retribution and their disgust with the "Christian-like 
character of the United States troops in the West" to 
create a Territorial militia.169 Always a flamboyant 
speaker, Meagher called for 600 volunteers who would save 
the Territory from the red scourge. Although the idea of a 
Territorial Militia appealed to many Montanans, when it came 
to committing themselves to an Indian campaign, most of the 
settlers were too busily engaged in mining activities to 
play soldier. Meagher's call to arms came at the beginning 
of the mining season, the number of those Montanans who 
enlisted in Meagher's campaign proved disappointing.170 
Indeed, not everyone in Montana Territory agreed with 
Meagher as to the necessity of an Indian War over Bozemen's 
death. Some saw through the thinly disguised reasons for 
going to war. Augustus H. Chapman, Flathead Indian Agent, 
wrote: 
Acting Governor Meagher's Indian war in 
Montana is the biggest humbug of the age, got up 
169Leeson, History of Montana, p. 118. 
170Athearn, "Early Territorial Montana," p. 18. 
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to advance his political interest, and to enable a 
lot of bummers who surround and hang onto him to 
make a big raid on the United States 
treasury...171 
In spite of poor enlistment and various criticisms, Meagher 
plunged on with his Indian war. On July 1, while at Fort 
Benton awaiting supplies and arms, Meagher fell off the deck 
of a riverboat and drowned. "Commander" Meagher led neither 
a single charge in Montana Territory nor took a single 
tribesmen's scalp. Despite a $2,000 reward and an extensive 
search, Meagher's body was never recovered from the murky 
depths of the Missouri River.172 
Governor Smith returned to Montana from Washington, 
D.C. in June, 1867. Upon Meagher's death, he took control 
of the newly organized militia in order to fight the Sioux 
and Blackfeet Indians. Writing to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs upon his return to Montana Territory, Smith offered 
his explanation of his position as he perceived it: 
I am here as Governor and ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs. My duties are 
two-fold — first to secure peaceable and 
amicable relations with the Indians if I can, (if 
I have the means and which I am perfectly willing 
to do) but forcibly if I must which I also am 
willing to do, and I have the means to do the 
1711867 House Executive Document no. 1, pt. 2, 40th Cong., 
2d sess., serial 1326, "Report of A. H. Chapman, Annual Report 
of the Secretary of the Interior, 1867." pp. 259-60. 
172Athearn, "Early Territorial Montana," p. 19. 
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latter.173 
This letter returned to the theme of Smith's first address 
to the Territorial Legislature. Because the federal 
government failed to supply those means the Governor deemed 
necessary to the peaceful settlement of Indian affairs in 
his Territory, he employed the means at hand, the local 
militia, and attempted to force peace through the use of 
violence. 
Montana's Territorial Militia accomplished little 
militarily. They marched through the Galatin Valley to the 
Yellowstone in May. In July they fought with a party of 
Crows who had stolen some livestock, and killed two 
tribesmen. In August, Blackfeet raided stations along the 
Northern Overland Mailroute at Fort Benton, stealing horses 
and one mail bag. In the same month, a captain of one unit 
killed a man in his command after the man attacked him.174 
Despite this poor performance, Montana Territory, 
unabashedly "made a big raid on the Treasury" and submitted 
an enormous bill to the federal government for its services. 
Smith professed great embarrassment when many of the 
additional militia which he had organized decamped with 
173Green Clay Smith to Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs, July 29, 1867, Letters received, Office of 
Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 
234, RG 75, NA. 
174Leeson, History of Montana, pp. 123-24. 
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horses, mules and supplies.175 
On June 20, 1867, Congress, frustrated with the 
inability of current Indian policy to keep peace on the 
frontier, authorized a commission to look into matters and 
recommend changes. This investigative committee, the 
Doolittle Commission, consisted of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Nathaniel Green Taylor; the Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Samuel F. Tappen; and 
former general John Sanborn. President Andrew Johnson, whom 
the commission charged with appointing three military 
representatives, selected Lieutenant General William T. 
Sherman, Major General William S. Harney, and Major General 
Alfred Terry.176 
The cornerstone of the Peace Commission's policy 
centered upon the settlement of the "wild" tribes west of 
the Mississippi River onto reservations. They concluded a 
number of treaties negotiated in whirlwind fashion with the 
Sioux, Comanches, Kiowas, Blackfeet, and Cheyennes. These 
treaties established two vast reservation complexes, to be 
held by these tribes in perpetuity. The northernmost lay in 
present day South Dakota, while the southern reservation was 
175Calloway, "Governor Green Clay Smith," pp.121-22. 
176Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the 
Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1956) p. 172. 
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situated in Oklahoma. Other provisions contained in these 
treaties called for the distribution of annuities, the 
introduction of schools for Indian children, and the 
establishment of schools designed to teach agricultural 
techniques to the tribesmen. Unfortunately, the Senate's 
lack of action in ratifying these treaties compelled the 
Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Comanches, who had already 
surrendered their old lands, once again to take to the 
warpath. As a direct consequence of the Senate's inability 
or unwillingness to ratify these treaties, the West, from 
the Rio Grande to the Canadian Border, blazed into flames 
with yet more Indian wars.177 
Despite of the Senate's inability to act, in 1868, the 
Doolittle Commission issued a very lengthy report which 
recommended a number of modifications and improvements to 
existing Federal Indian policy. The Doolittle Commission's 
Report provided a foundation upon which President Grant 
based his Peace Policy of 1869. Perhaps most significant, 
the Commission recommended that governors of territories no 
longer act in the capacity of ex-officio superintendents of 
Indian Affairs. The Commission also recommended that 
militia not be used to wage war with the Indians. It 
alluded to both the disastrous Sand Creek Massacre in 
177Utley/ "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General Grant, " 
pp. 122-24. 
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Colorado, as well as to the fact that "A regiment of Montana 
troops last September would have involved us in an almost 
interminable war with the Crows but for the timely 
intervention of the military authorities."178 The latter 
incident referred to Meagher and Smith's trumped up Indian 
war of the previous year. The Doolittle Report signaled a 
move on the part of the federal government toward greater 
centralization and tighter control over the management of 
Indian affairs. The days of superintendents and 
superintendencies grew short from this point. Montana's 
short experience directly contributed to this far-reaching 
policy change. 
This new Federal activism in dealing with Indian 
affairs became manifest when on April 15, 1868, President 
Johnson appointed William J. Cullen as Special Indian Agent 
in Montana. Cullen's mission was to 
...negotiate treaties with such of the tribes of 
Montana Territory as maybe advisable with a view 
to extinguishment of the title to the lands 
claimed by them, and to their locations upon 
suitable reservations.179 
1781868 House Executive Document no. 1, 40th Cong., 3d 
sess., serial 1366, "Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs p. 508. The entire report is contained in the 
Commissioner's Annual message, p. 509. 
179Charles E. Mix, acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
to W.T. Otto, Acting Secretary of the Interior, September 8, 
1868, Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana 
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
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Cullen's first hand experience with Indian affairs 
seemed to especially qualify him for the job of special 
agent. He had served as the former Commissioner for the 
State of Minnesota during the Sioux uprising in 1862. 
Commissioner Cullen received much credit for successfully 
handling the situation.180 Cullen's course of action to 
preserve the peace in Montana Territory, particularly with 
the Blackfeet who had not received their promised annuities 
and whose lands were being overrun with white immigrants, 
involved honoring the terms of the existing treaties in the 
same manner as the Blackfeet honored them. Because the 
Missouri River was running low in 1868, many whites would 
travel by land through Blackfeet hunting grounds, thus 
making the situation between whites and Indians even more 
explosive. Cullen believed that the best solution involved 
placing the Blackfeet on farms. This action would then 
remove the Blackfeet from the vicinity of Fort Benton 
"...where there is so much to excite and exasperate 
them. "181 
In the typical rapid fire succession of the Peace 
180James M. Cavanaugh, Delegate from Montana Territory, to 
Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 11, 
1868, Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana 
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
181W.J. Cullen to N.G. Taylor, April 3, 1868, Letters 
received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, 
Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
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Commission's Indian Treaty negotiations, Cullen managed to 
sign treaties with the Gros Ventre on July 13, 1868, the 
River Crow on July 15, 1868, and the Blackfeet on September 
1, 1868. "The provisions and stipulations agreed upon" in 
these treaties were "substantially the same as those 
proposed in the Treaty of 1865, known as the Upson 
Treaty.1,182 
Efforts to establish peaceful relations with the 
Indians faced considerable obstacles. The Indian Service 
lacked a manageable chain of command, and the Indian 
Service, rife with corruption, was ill-served by many of 
those who worked within it. Although generally popular with 
his constituents in Montana Territory, Governor Smith had 
detractors within the Indian Service. Blackfeet Indian 
Agent George B. Wright accused the Governor of incompetence 
and mismanagement of funds. On June 11, 1868, Wright wrote 
to Commissioner of Indian Affairs N. G. Taylor and accused 
the Governor of using $1,800 appropriated to the Blackfeet 
Agency for gambling purposes.183 Wright must have been an 
impetuous man, because four days later he wrote to Taylor 
182Charles E. Mix, acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
to W.T. Otto, Acting Secretary of the Interior, September 8, 
1868, Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana 
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA. 
183George B. Wright to N.G Taylor, June 11, 1868, Letters 
Received, State Department Territorial Papers, Montana, 1864-
72, Roll 401, Microcopy T254, RG 75, NA. 
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reversing himself. In a letter dated June 15, 1868, Wright 
informed Taylor that he had been misled when he accused 
Smith of official misconduct due to the fact that the people 
who had related the story to him were Smith's personal and 
political enemies.184 
Smith went east in the summer of 18 68, and never 
returned to Montana. Until his successor, Benjamin Franklin 
Potts arrived in mid-summer 1869, Territorial Secretary 
James Tufts served as Acting Governor and ex-officio 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs. After leaving Montana 
Territory, Smith devoted himself to the Baptist ministry. 
He briefly returned to public life in 187 6, when the 
Prohibition Party delegates unanimously nominated him to run 
as their presidential candidate. As a third party 
candidate, Smith managed to garner 9,522 popular votes.185 
James M. Ashley served next as Montana's Territorial 
Governor. Born on November 14, 1822, in Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, Ashley received little formal schooling. He 
studied law under Charles 0. Tracey before gaining admission 
to the bar in 184 9. Ashley held a number of positions 
including editor of the Democrat in Portsmith, Ohio in 1848. 
184George B. Wright to N.G Taylor, June 15, 1868, Letters 
Received, State Department Territorial Papers, Montana, 1864-
72, Roll 401, Microcopy T254, RG 75, NA. 
185Calloway, "Governor Green Clay Smith," p. 137. 
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Traveling to Toledo in 1851, he engaged himself in both boat 
construction and in the pharmaceutical business. During 
these years, Ashley gave considerable assistance to runaway 
slaves.186 
In 1858, Ashley, an avid student of politics, won a 
seat in the House of Representatives as a Republican from 
Ohio. He quickly associated himself with the most radical 
of Republicans, or "Black Republicans", who refused to 
compromise their anti-slavery position. He befriended the 
influential Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, and 
thus, Ashley became the Chairman of the Committee on 
Territories. Under his tenure the Territory of Montana was 
created. Congressman Ashley emerged as one of the more 
influential members of the Radical Reconstructionists and 
became a leader in the movement to impeach President Andrew 
Johnson.187 
Ashley lost his bid for re-election in 1869. Shortly 
after Grant's inauguration, on April 27, 1869, the new 
president Grant nominated Ashley as Territorial Governor of 
Montana. The nomination, waa controversial, and it passed 
186Charles S. Ashley, "Governor Ashley's Biography and 
Messages" Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, 
Vol. VI (1907) p. 148. 
187McMullin and Walker, Biographical Dictionary of 
American Territorial Governors, p. 214. 
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the Senate by only one vote.188 Ashley arrived in the 
Territory in mid-summer and set up his residence in Helena, 
although Virginia City still remained the Territory's 
official capital.189 
Ashley's tenure began less than an auspiciously. By 
delaying his departure from Washington, D.C. and dallying in 
the Capital for a considerable length of time, he had caused 
some concern in official circles. The former Collector of 
Interior Revenue, H. Case, wrote President Ulysses S. Grant 
on June 25, 1869, to inform the President that Ashley had 
not yet departed for Montana Territory and was using his 
time in Washington to attend private and public meetings 
ostensibly for the purposes of inducing immigrants to the 
Territory. In reality, Case reported, these meetings were, 
"for electioneering purposes, tending to perpetuate strife 
and division in the Republican Party of the District."190 
Governor Ashley fit the mold of those Territorial 
Governors appointed to their positions solely for political 
188See Ashley, "Governor Ashley's Biography and Messages" 
p. 189, and Clark C. Spence, "Spoilsman in Montana," Montana, 
the Magazine of Western History, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, April 
1968, p. 27. 
189Ashley, "Governor Ashley's Biography and Messages" 
Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, p. 191. 
190H.Case to President Ulysses S. Grant, June 25, 1869, 
Letters Received, State Department Territorial Papers, 
Montana, 1864-72, Roll 401, Microcopy T254, RG 75, NA. 
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reasons. Strong opposition as well as support existed for 
Ashley among the citizens in Montana Territory. Moreover, 
his political support was not broadly based. His support or 
lack thereof followed strict, deeply drawn Republican or 
Democratic Party lines.191 
By 1869, and the beginning of President Ulysses S. 
Grant's administration, few members of government could with 
any assurance argue that the nation's Indian Policy had not 
totally and completely failed. Grant, the nation's number 
one military man, inaugurated his Peace Policy, or, as it is 
sometimes erroneously called, the Quaker Policy. The Peace 
Policy is often mistakenly confused with the Peace 
Commission, an entirely different Federal initiative, 
enacted by the Johnson Administration in 1867 .192 
Ashley, in his sole address to Montana's Territorial 
Legislature, clearly expressed his contempt for and 
disinterest in Montana Territory's tribesmen in particular, 
and Indian affairs in general, when he stated: 
The practical working of our Indian policy 
from the organization of the government to this 
time, has been an offense against civilization. 
As I have but little hope of seeing a change in 
our Indian policy while an Indian survives, I make 
191Spence, "Spoilsman in Montana, 11 p. 28. 
192Utley, "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General Grant," 
p. 121. 
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no suggestions touching Indian affairs.193 
In the same address, the Governor expressed his contempt for 
the treaty system and called on all western citizens to 
demand that their national government cease making treaties 
with the Indians, giving "the right of any tribe or band of 
wandering savages to make war or peace at pleasure."194 
Although Grant appointed Ashley Territorial Governor of 
Montana in April 1869, Ashley never received the chance to 
serve as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs. On 
June 1, 1869, shortly after Ashley's appointment, Congress 
created an independent Indian superintendency for Montana 
Territory that functioned separately from and outside of, 
the office of the Territorial Governor. Montana's 
Territorial Governors never again served as ex-officio 
superintendents of Indian affairs.195 
The hypocrisy, perpetuated by Territorial Governors 
Edgerton, Meagher, and Smith (Ashley would likely have 
followed suit) when they paid lip service to Indian affairs 
as ex-officio superintendents of Indian Affairs had ended. 
With the creation of an independent superintendency, the 
antagonistic policy objectives of the governor and 
193Ashley, "Governor Ashley's Biography and Messages" p. 
285. 
194Ibid., p. 284. 
195Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p.101. 
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superintendent surfaced, and Ashley, as Territorial 
Governor, could openly and without reservation, champion the 
interests of the Territory's white voters over the 
tribesmen. 
Ashley was denied the opportunity to display his 
talents as Montana's Territorial Governor. Grant, for 
reasons never made public, relieved Ashley of the position 
in December 1869 .196 The political climate which had 
motivated Grant to appoint Ashley had changed, and Ashley 
was dismissed. There is little doubt that Grant made the 
correct decision in dismissing Ashley from office. Ashley's 
fiery brand of Radical Republicanism burned more vehemently 
than Edgerton's. His Indian policy, even though he was 
officially removed from making or implementing it, appeared 
to be even more uncaring and uninspiring than that of his 
predecessors. In the interim, Montana's Territorial 
Secretary, Wiley S. Schribner acted as Territorial Governor 
until the arrival of Grant's next appointee, Benjamin 
Franklin Potts, who reached Montana Territory in late August 
1870. Ashley, who lived for another twenty-five years, 
never again held public office.197 
196Ashley, "Governor Ashley's Biography and Messages" p. 
194 . 
197McMullin and Walker, Biographical Dictionary of 
American Territorial Governors, p. 214. 
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By 1869, as part and policy of President Johnson's 
Peace Committee, military personnel had replaced most of the 
civilian agents, whom the government summarily suspended. 
Johnson gave way to Grant on March 4, 18 69. In his 
inaugural address, Grant stated: "The proper treatment of 
the original inhabitants of this land -the Indians - is one 
deserving of careful study. I will favor any course towards 
them which tends to their civilization and ultimate 
citizenship."198 In keeping with these sentiments 
expressed in his inaugural address, the following year, 
President Ulysses S. Grant reversed Johnson's policy of 
using military personnel as Indian agents. Under Grant, 
civilians associated with religious bodies, most noticeably 
the Society of Friends, or Quakers, replaced the military 
men. Common practice, however, continued to allow the 
temporary appointment of military officers as Indian agents, 
particularly hostile areas.199 
The reforms of Grant's Peace Policy concentrated on the 
selection of superintendents and agents hoping the churches 
would provide honest men. In his Annual Report for 1870, 
Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano looked back over 
198Wesley C. Wilson, "The U.S. Army and the Piegans: The 
Baker Massacre on the Marias, 1870." North Dakota History, 
Vol. 32, No. 1, January, 1965. p. 41. 
199Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, p.3. 
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the previous year since the inauguration of Grant's Peace 
policy, and wrote the following: 
The tribes in Nebraska and Kansas, and some of 
those most recently placed upon the reservations 
in the Indian Territory, were placed under the 
control of members of the Society of Friends; the 
others were given in charge of military personnel, 
who were waiting orders under the laws for the 
reduction of the army.200 
The Secretary went on to explain that "changes were made 
because it was believed that the public opinion of the 
country demanded a radical re-organization of this branch of 
the service."201 According to Secretary Delano, the 
selection of the officers to hold position in the Indian 
service, "...was made partly for economic reasons, as they 
were on pay though not on duty, and the salaries of many 
civil officers could thus be saved, and partly because it 
was believed they furnished a corps of public servants whose 
integrity and faithfulness could be relied upon, and in whom 
the public was prepared to have confidence."202 
The Grant administration turned to religious 
organizations in an attempt to eliminate corruption and 
patronage while stressing civil, as opposed to military 
2OO1870 House Executive Document no. 1, pt. 2, 41st Cong., 
3d sess., serial 1449, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior, 1870." p. x. 
201Ibid. 
202Ibid. 
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relations with the Indian. 
The Friends (Quakers) were appointed not 
because they were believed to have any monopoly of 
honesty or good will towards the Indians, but 
because their selection would of itself be 
understood by the country to indicate the policy 
adopted, namely, the sincere cultivation of 
peaceful relations with the tribes, and the choice 
of agents who did not, for personal profit, seek 
the service, but were sought for it because they 
were at least deemed fit for its duties...203 
A major impetus behind Grant's Peace Policy lay in the need 
to defuse the public's cries of corruption and mismanagement 
in the handling by the government of Indian Affairs. 
Grant's Peace Policy featured two main elements. In 
addition to appointing members of religious orders as Indian 
Agents, Congress authorized a commission of philanthropic 
citizens, outside of the government, who would advise the 
government in matters concerning Indian policy. More 
important, these civilian advisors were authorized by 
executive order to "...inspect all the accounts and records 
of the Bureau, to be present at the purchases of Indian 
goods and advise them to the conduct of the same, and to 
visit and inspect the tribes in their reservations and 
examine the business of all the agencies."204 These two 
elements of the Peace Policy were designed, by substituting 
new officers selected by a different criteria and organizing 
203Ibid. 
204Ibid. pp. x-xi. 
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an official body to perform inspections, to reform the 
Indian Bureau, and, at the same time, to prevent any more 
Indian uprisings. Grant's program also intended to end the 
partisan political natures of superintendents. Ironically 
for a president whose own administration suffered from 
cronyism and corruption, Grant tried to eliminate these 
vices from the Indian Service. 
By 1867, it had become clear that the Indian Service as 
well as Indian policy needed reform. By 1868, the wounds of 
the Civil War, if not healed, were less now, and the nation, 
trying to put the conflict behind it, had the energy and 
resources to look west and implement the reforms. Many 
adhered to the "safety valve" theory, which held that 
regardless of the adversity, a man could move out west and 
start anew. Therefore, the west had to be made safe for 
immigrants starting new lives. In order to open the lands 
for settlement, the title to Indian lands had to be secured 
and extended. In addition, the Indians had to be 
aculturalized to make the land safe. The Doolittle 
Commission recognized that having territorial governors 
serve as ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs 
created problems and thus impeded the settlement of the 
West. It therefore recommended that the two positions be 
separated. Grant recognized the inability of warfare to 
subdue the "wild" tribes and inaugurated his "Peace Policy", 
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which placed those affiliated with religious orders as heads 
of Indian agencies, and played down the role of federal 
troops in implementing Indian policy. As radical as the 
reforms enacted in the Indian Bureau appeared, relations 
between Indians and whites had changed little. 
CHAPTER V 
THE MONTANA SUPERINTENDENCY: 
JUNE 1, 1869 - JUNE 30, 1873 
With Major Alfred Sully'" s appointment as Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs on June 1, 1869, the territorial governor 
was freed from his responsibility as ex-officio 
superintendent of Indian affairs. However, many of the same 
problems were carried over, and Indian-American relations 
did not improve. Indeed, they worsened. By the time 
Congress appointed Sully, the Montana Superintendency, under 
the territorial governor as ex-officio superintendent of 
Indian affairs, had so exacerbated Indian relations through 
neglect, that it was too late to improve them. This led to 
a major restructuring of the administration of Indian 
affairs. Congress abolished the Montana Superintendency, and 
thereafter Indian agents reported directly to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C. 
The territorial governors' role as ex-officio 
superintendents of Indian affairs has been largely ignored 
by historians mainly because the territorial governors 
ignored the role themselves. Sidney Edgerton did not submit 
one annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
even though submission was required and Edgerton was paid to 
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do so. 
Edgerton cannot be singled out as the only culprit. 
Governors Thomas Francis Meagher and Green Clay Smith were 
more than ready to take to the field against marauding 
Indians. Were they willing to organize a militia to protect 
the Indians rights from transgressing whites? Of course 
not. To do so would have been impossible. Edgerton at 
least recognized white transgressions against the Indians as 
one of the main problems in keeping peace with the Indians, 
Yet even he would have been powerless to enact a policy to 
protect Indian rights. 
And what of the qualifications of these men to hold 
office as ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs? 
Edgerton, Meagher and Smith never saw an Indian until they 
reached Montana. These men were completely ignorant of 
their charges. Appointed by the President to their position 
usually as a reward for political favors, appointees to the 
territorial governorship viewed their positions as temporary 
and as stepping stones to a more favored or lucrative 
political position, usually to the United States Senate. 
The quickest way to these better positions was to push white 
immigration to secure the requisite number of voters for 
statehood. The surest method to entice immigration involved 
securing title to the Indian lands that could then be opened 
up to white settlement. 
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Congress with its niggardly appropriations to the 
territories can be blamed for a great many problems with 
Indian/American relations. After placing the tribesmen on 
reservations, we have seen how the slowness or inability to 
deliver promised annuity goods enraged the Indians, who took 
to stealing horses and cattle in order to survive. As these 
depredations continued against white property, isolated 
killing occurred and settlers called for military action. 
Coloradans and Montanans formed their own militia to extract 
revenge on Indians, with disastrous results for the 
relations between Indians and whites. 
However, the appointment of a professional, independent 
superintendent of Indian affairs in Montana Territory did 
not appreciably change matters. Alfred Sully recognized a 
common problem. Writing in his annual report to the 
commissioner of Indian Affairs, he stated: 
...no appropriation(s have been) made for these 
(Blackfeet) Indians last year, and in consequence 
there is nothing coming to them this year - not 
even their usual very small amount of annuity 
goods.205 
When faced with starvation on a reservation, the 
Indians, took to raiding livestock. On August 17, 1869, 
members of the Piegan Tribe, part of the Blackfeet 
2051869 House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1414. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs." p. 732. 
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Confederacy, had killed rancher/trader Malcolm Clark and his 
son. Although there were extenuating circumstances behind 
the murder, (Clark, a brash man with an abusive personality 
had humiliated one of the Indians) Montanans demanded the 
guilty parties be punished. Officials of the Indian Bureau 
made the effort to induce friendly Blackfeet chiefs to turn 
over the guilty parties. When the chiefs were unable to 
comply, retaliation became inevitable.206 
The resulting "Piegan Massacre" led by Colonel Eugene 
M. Baker ranks with the "Sand Creek Massacre" of Colorado's 
John Chivington. Under orders to "strike them hard," Baker 
and troops of the Second Cavalry from Fort Shaw and Fort 
Ellis, fell on Chief Heavy Runner's camps in the freezing 
dawn on January 23, 1870. Heavy Runner was killed waving a 
piece of paper given to him by an Indian agent stating he 
was not a "hostile."207 Baker's official report on the 
incident, dated February 18, 1870, curiously failed to break 
down the one hundred and seventy-three Indians killed by age 
or sex. 208 Lieutenant William B. Pease, Blackfeet Indian 
Agent from June 11, 1869 - September 9, 1870, as part of a 
206Wilson, "The U.S. Army and the Piegans, " pp. 47-4 9. 
207Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
208 1 8 6 9 - 18 7 0 House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Cong., 
2d sess., serial 1419. "Expedition Against Piegan Indians." 
p. 2 . 
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standard report, broke down the casualties as follows: "173 
killed - 33 men, of which 15 were young or fighting men; 90 
women; and 55 children."209 
Baker and the Second Cavalry were hailed as heroes in 
Montana. Indeed, the Piegans, decimated by war and small 
pox, resigned themselves to life on the reservation from 
that moment forward. The reaction in the East was quite 
different, and this tragic incident on the Marias River in a 
remote part of a remote territory, had profound effects. In 
accordance with Section 18 of the Army Appropriation Act of 
July 15, 1870, Congress ended the policy of offering army 
officers to serve as Indian agents or superintendents. As a 
consequence, Major General Alfred Sully was replaced by Mr. 
Jasper A. Viall on September 9, 1870. Congress reversed the 
policy of putting military men in charge of Indian Bureau 
facilities. The Indian Department Appropriation Act of 
March 3, 1871 reversed the policy of treating the Indians as 
sovereign nations. This cleared the way for the Federal 
Government to take charge of the Indians as wards of the 
state and to provide for their welfare, not as members of a 
foreign state, but rather as part of the general population 
and as potential citizens.210 
209Wilson, "The U.S. Army and the Piegans," p. 51. 
210Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
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The experience of Montana's territorial governors as 
ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs provides an 
insight into the problem of territorial governors serving as 
superintendents of Indian affairs. The contradiction in 
duties between the two offices made it impossible adequately 
to fulfill the obligations of either. Territorial governors 
themselves were aware of the contradiction. Investigating 
bodies pointed out the difficulties as well. This explains 
why even conscientious territorial governors failed to meet 
their responsibilities as superintendent of Indian affairs. 
In part, the inactivity of Montana's Territorial 
Governors in Indian affairs may have reflected the time at 
which Montana became a Territory. The Doolittle 
Commission's report criticizing the practice of having 
territorial governors serve as Indian superintendents came 
less than four years after the establishment of the Montana 
Territory. The following year, President Johnson's policy 
had replaced most of the civilian Indian agents with 
military men. Montana's Territorial Governors foresaw their 
eventual removal from Indian affairs. 
This change represented part of a larger shift away 
from local control of Indian affairs and toward a 
centralized policy made by the federal government. Even 
when Grant replaced military Indian agents with people 
affiliated with religious organizations, the control of 
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Indian affairs remained with the national government. Once 
again, this occurred just after Montana was organized as a 
territory. Therefore, even as they took up the job of ex-
of f icio superintendent of Indian affairs, Montana's 
territorial governors knew that there authority in that area 
was being taken over by the federal government. 
The problems, however, ran deeper than changes in 
administrative policy could ever solve. Even the reforms of 
the Grant administration failed to address the basic 
problem. The tragedy of United States-Indian relations 
transcended any adjustment in administrative practice. 
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